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This thesis is concerned with the role of product quality in explaining observed price 
and trade patterns. The first chapter introduces the topic, summarizes the main 
findings of the dissertation and contrasts them to other results in the literature. The 
second chapter develops a tractable general equilibri m model that includes quality 
differentiation among heterogeneous firms. The theory explicitly demonstrates how 
heterogeneity in a single exogenous parameter, productivity, can produce dispersion 
in product quality and price. The framework predicts that relatively productive firms 
will choose to produce high quality varieties. This finding accords well with the 
observation that the unit value of exported varieties increases with exporter’s income, 
capital- and skill- abundance. The model is used to analyze how international trade 
policy and quality differentiation interact to shape atterns of production and trade 
flows. In particular, the model predicts a positive relationship between product 
quality and export status at the firm level and that tr de liberalization decreases the 
average quality of a country’s exports. 
  
The third chapter evaluates the importance of vertical product differentiation in 
explaining price and export status patterns observed in microdata on U.S. 
manufacturing plants. The main difficulty in exploring the impact of vertical product 
differentiation is that product quality is not directly observable. The analysis tackles 
the problem from two angles. First, the chapter develops a novel empirical strategy to 
obtain a proxy for quality, which is then used to evaluate important conditional 
correlations. The results show that both quality and productivity are important 
determinants of price and export status pattern. Second, the simulated method of 
moments is used to obtain structural estimates of the parameters of the model and to 
assess the importance of quality differentiation. The estimates suggest that quality 
differentiation plays an important role in explaining the variation in price, size and 
export status across U.S. manufacturing plants. 
The fourth chapter briefly concludes by summarizing the main findings and 
suggesting avenues for future research. Overall the analysis presented in this 
dissertation implies that vertical product differentiation, or quality, plays an important 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The rigorous analysis of U.S. import data by Schott (2004) reveals a striking pattern: 
within some narrowly defined product categories, firms located in high income, 
capital-rich and skill-abundant countries export relatively high priced units to the 
U.S.1 This observation has at least two important implications: First, assuming that 
firms in wealthy countries are on average more productive, it must be the case that 
relatively productive firms produce varieties for which the consumer’s willingness to 
pay is higher. Second, for differentiated products, the unit value reflects not only the 
efficiency of the production process but also the product’s quality. These 
considerations suggest that studying the relationship between firm productivity and 
product quality would lead to an improved understanding of international trade flows.  
The potential for quality differentiation forces usto rethink the impact of trade 
liberalization on both industrialized and developing countries. Quality upgrading is an 
important margin producers in developed countries can exploit to resist low-wage 
import competition. For instance, the entry of low cost producers, such as Chinese 
and Indian firms, could lead to a reallocation of resources towards high quality 
varieties in technologically advanced countries. Moreover, since worker relocation is 
likely to be easier within than across industries, within-industry specialization reduces 
the predicted welfare loss associated with the short-run adjustment that usually 
follows a trade liberalization episode. 
                                                
1 Other recent papers look at price in aggregate trade data. See for instance, Hummels and Klenow 




The motives for quality upgrading are important for issues beyond international 
trade. The analysis of vertical differentiation brings to the fore an important weakness 
of a widely used productivity estimation procedure. Typically, in the absence of 
producer-level price information, output revenues and input expenditures are deflated 
by sector-level price indices and productivity estimates are defined as the residual in a 
regression of log deflated output revenues on log deflated input expenditures at the 
producer-level. If variation in product quality leads to price dispersion, however, such 
a procedure will lead to systematic biases in the productivity estimates. Moreover, 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) point to the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
productivity estimates in the presence of vertical product differentiation even when 
microdata information on output quantity is available.2 In general, high input price 
plants have low quantity total factor productivity values because their input 
expenditures per units of output are larger than those of their industry counterparts.3 
Should we therefore conclude that these plants are less productive if their output is of 
superior quality and can fetch a higher unit value on the market? Not necessarily. If 
producing a high quality product requires relatively costly high quality inputs then the 
quantity productivity estimates understate the trueproductivity of the firm. The same 
is true if the quantity of inputs required to produce one unit of output is increasing in 
quality. In general both inputs and outputs should be computed on a quality adjusted 
basis in order to make accurate inferences on plant roductivity. Understanding the 
                                                
2 Their work explores the separate contributions of idiosyncratic technology and demand to plant 
survival and productivity growth. The analysis uses a ubset of 11 homogenous products to minimize 
differences in quality across plants. 
3 Quantity TFP reflects producer’s average cost per unit (i.e. dispersion in physical efficiency and 
factor input prices). In Foster et al. (2008) and the current study it is obtained by computing the 





impact of product quality on production cost, output rice and revenue could lead to 
the development of improved measures of productivity. 
 The importance of quality in explaining trade flows was first emphasized by 
Linder (1961), who argued that consumers in rich countries spend relatively more on 
high quality goods than consumers in poor countries. In that case, closeness to 
demand provides richer countries with a comparative advantage in the production of 
high-quality goods. In the late 1980s several economists formalized the demand side 
relationship between trade and quality in general equilibrium models.4 The main 
prediction that bilateral trade should be decreasing in the countries’ dissimilarity, 
generally measured by income per capita difference, received some empirical 
support.5 However, it is not clear that consumers in rich countries purchase higher 
quality goods exclusively because they have different preferences. Holding 
preferences fixed, the distribution of product quality may not be independent of the 
distribution of firm productivity. Unfortunately, despite the wealth of evidence about 
the importance of vertical differentiation, the literature still lacks a general framework 
to think about the supply-side factors affecting differences in product quality across 
countries. 
The main objective of chapter 2 is to fill this gap by introducing vertical 
differentiation in a heterogeneous firms framework. The model focuses on the supply 
side implications linking firms’ productivity to quality choice and can be used to 
                                                
4 The major contributions are Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987), Flam and Helpman (1987), Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997). 
5 Hallak (2006) estimates destination-country income effects and find evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that richer countries have relatively high demand for high quality. Choi et al. (2006) report 
that the pairs of importers whose income distributions look more similar have more export partners in 




answer many important questions that have, so far, escaped the scrutiny of 
economists. For instance, how do vertical differentiation and trade policies interact to 
shape patterns of production and international trade within an industry? How does 
trade liberalization affect the average quality of output in a country? Is there a 
systematic relationship between firm level productivity and product quality? 
 The basic set-up of the model is borrowed from Melitz (2003) and is extended to 
allow for multiple market segments each characterized by a specific level of quality. 
In the model quality is defined as variation in demand due to voluntary actions by the 
firm and unexplained by changes in price.6 The core of the model is relatively simple. 
After learning their productivity, firms simultaneously choose the price and quality of 
the goods they produce. If the firm invests in an advanced technology and incurs 
relatively high fixed and variable production costs, consumers classify the output as 
high quality. As a result, the firm obtains a favorable demand shift and can charge a 
relatively high unit price for its output. The model l ads to endogenous sorting of 
firms across market segments and predicts that, in equilibrium, the most productive 
firms choose to produce high quality varieties. Intuitively, since within each market 
segment the increase in firm-level profit is limited by the decreasing marginal utility 
of consumers, the gain from a price reduction as firm productivity increases 
eventually becomes less important than the gain from switching to a higher quality 
variety. As a result, highly productive firms choose to acquire an expensive 
technology and produce high quality products. 
                                                





 Introducing endogenous product quality decisions provides a number of new 
results and helps reconcile the theory with the observed facts. For instance, in the 
extended model an increase in average firm level productivity increases the average 
quality of output such that, assuming firms in rich ountries are generally more 
productive than firms in developing countries, the average quality of output will be 
positively correlated with the country’s income. More ver, the extended model 
predicts a positive relationship between trade cost and average export quality – a 
result akin to the “shipping the good apples out” paradigm described by Alchian and 
Allen (1964). Both predictions are opposite to a benchmark model without 
endogenous quality and are consistent with empirical observations. 
 The ability of the model to replicate aggregate trade flow patterns hinges on 
assumptions about the structure of cost in the industry. Essentially, the framework 
assumes that quality is costly to produce, which leads to a positive relationship 
between quality and productivity. The obvious next step is to evaluate the empirical 
relevance of this assumption. This is one of the main objectives of chapter 3. Since 
the model is built to replicate aggregate patterns, the analysis must go beyond country 
level data and focus on data at the production unit level to obtain meaningful tests of 
the theory. Fortunately, the framework provides many important testable predictions. 
For instance, the model predicts positive relationships between unit price and 
production cost, between productivity and quality and between export status and 
quality at the producer level. 
The main difficulty in exploring the impact of vertical product differentiation is 




use the average unit value, an estimate of price, to make inferences about the role of 
product quality in determining export patterns.7 However, this strategy potentially 
leads to biased results. First, many factors besides variation in quality can lead to 
price dispersion. For instance, Syverson (2004) show  that variation in regional 
demand and competition are important sources of price heterogeneity.8 Second, price 
dispersion does not necessarily capture the full extent of quality variation. The model 
in chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that in the presence of vertical product 
differentiation, productivity affects price through two distinct channels. On the one 
hand, productivity leads to a decrease in marginal production cost, thereby decreasing 
the equilibrium price. On the other hand, productivity increases the quality of output, 
which raises the marginal production cost and the equilibrium price. The overall 
impact of productivity on price and, as a result, the relationship between price and 
quality, depend on the underlying parameters of the model. For instance, in those 
industries where price and quality are only weakly positively related, an increase in 
product quality will not be reflected in price but rather in the quantity demanded. It 
thus seems important to move away from unit value and to take into account the 
separate roles of productivity and other factors affecting price dispersion when 
studying product quality. 
In the model quality is defined as non random variation in demand unexplained 
by changes in price. These demand “residuals” are estimated for U.S. manufacturing 
plants producing in 125 five-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries 
                                                
7 In particular, the recent studies of Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) 
show that the correlation between average unit value nd export status is positive. Manova and Zhang 
(2009) use unit value to study the impact of trade cost on export price. 
8 Since this variation demand does not arise because of the firm’s action it is does not enter the 




over the period 1972-1997 using the residuals from producer level regressions of 
quantity on price controlling for regional demand and plant age. The estimated 
demand residuals are positively correlated with advertising and new technology 
expenditures and marginal production cost at the producer level. These results suggest 
that demand residuals are not random but rather arise from deliberate activities on the 
part of the plant aimed at increasing the consumer’s valuation of its output.  
Using the demand residuals as a measure of quality, the study obtains the 
following producer-level results: (i) Quality is positively correlated with unit cost and 
price on average; (ii) Productivity is negatively correlated with unit cost and price on 
average; (iii) Productivity and quality are positively correlated on average; (iv) 
Quality is an important determinant of the plant’s export status. All of these findings 
are consistent with the model and suggests that vertical product differentiation plays 
an important role in explaining plant-level price and export status patterns. 
The second part of the empirical analysis uses the simulated method of moment 
(SMM) to obtain estimates for the structural parameters and evaluate the ability of the 
model to reproduced observed facts. The basic question i  the following. Suppose that 
the best possible values – in a sense to be made precise – for the structural parameters 
are selected, how well can the model reproduce pattrns observed in the data, such as 
the distribution of revenue across producers or the share of exporters in the industry? 
If the model captures the essential behavioral characte istics of producers, the 
simulated moments should be similar to the actual moments. Overall the model is 
able to replicate important features of the data such as the standard deviation in price 




estimated parameter values provide evidence of the importance of vertical product 
differentiation. 
To summarize, the dissertation uses theoretical, empirical and computational 
methods to study the role of product differentiation n shaping price dispersion and 
trade patterns. Overall the thesis demonstrates that e scope for quality 
differentiation has an important effect on the behavior of producer and the 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Results 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical model that incorporates quality differentiation into 
a heterogeneous firm framework. The model is used to analyze the impact of the 
quality margin on the relationship between firm level productivity, price and export 
status. The basic set-up is borrowed from Melitz (2003) and is extended to allow for 
multiple market segments each characterized by a specific level of quality. The 
extended model is based on two reasonable assumptions: ( ) holding quality fixed, an 
increase in productivity decreases unit production c st, and (ii) holding productivity 
fixed, an increase in product quality increases production cost. The quality of the 
output is chosen endogenously by the firms and depends on the technology employed 
in its production. Expensive technologies are associated with superior product quality 
and, as a result, higher demand conditional on price. The model leads to endogenous 
sorting across product quality and predicts that, in equilibrium, high productivity 
firms choose to produce high quality goods. The intuition for this result is simple. On 
the one hand, the marginal gain from increasing sales by lowering price is limited by 
the decreasing marginal utility of consumers. On the other hand, the marginal cost of 
production is decreasing in productivity, thereby increasing the gains from quality 
upgrading. 
Introducing endogenous product quality decisions provides a number of new 




model without quality, high prices are charged by firms with low productivity. Since 
a fixed cost has to be paid in order to sell in foreign markets, these firms are unlikely 
to export. This implies that countries populated by relatively productive firms will 
export low unit value varieties, a prediction which runs against the observed trade 
patterns. In particular, Schott (2004) presents strong empirical evidence that unit 
value of U.S. imports is increasing in the exporter’s income, and capital and skill 
abundance. In the extended model, varieties can be vertically differentiated at some 
cost such that higher prices reflect, at least in part, higher quality. When firms are 
allowed to climb this quality ladder, the relationship between productivity and price is 
no longer monotonic: the unit price is decreasing i productivity within a given 
market segment but it is increasing in quality across segments. Since producing high 
quality varieties is relatively costly, only the most productive firms are able to supply 
them profitably to the market. As a result, in the extended model, an increase in 
average firm level productivity increases the averag  quality of output such that, 
assuming firms in rich countries are generally more p oductive than firms in 
developing countries, the average quality of output will be positively correlated with 
the country’s income. Importantly, this result is not driven by consumer preferences 
but by changes in the firms’ productivity distribution. The model is therefore a 
supply-side explanation for the pattern of unit-value in trade flows described by 
Schott (2004). 
 Moreover, the benchmark model without quality predicts that an increase in trade 
costs forces the marginally profitable exporters out f the foreign market, thereby 




inconsistent with observed characteristics of trade flows. Baldwin and Harrigan 
(2007), in their study of product-level data on bilateral U.S. exports, report that 
“distance has a very large positive effect on unit values.” In the extended model, trade 
liberalization decreases the average quality of a country’s exports. This happens 
because trade liberalization leads to tougher competition by raising the productivity 
threshold above which firms decide to upgrade the quality of their product and 
increases the share of exporting firms. Together thse results imply that a larger 
fraction of exporting firms produce low quality varieties in equilibrium. Therefore, 
the extended model predicts a positive relationship between trade cost and quality – a 
result akin to the “shipping the good apples out” paradigm described by Alchian and 
Allen (1964).9 An important corollary of this result is that trade liberalization, by 
increasing imports of high quality goods, leads to an increase in the average quality of 
consumption. This happens because the average quality of exported goods is 
relatively high compared to the average quality of overall production. 
 The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces quality 
differentiation among heterogeneous firms in a closed economy setting. The 
equilibrium is then analyzed in detail in section 2.3. In section 2.4, the model is 
extended to a multi-country trading world. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 analyze the impact of 
trade and trade liberalization respectively while section 2.7 concludes. Derivation of 
major results and proofs of propositions are presented in appendix A at the end of the 
dissertation. 
 
                                                




2.2 Closed Economy Model 
Consider an economy composed of a measure L of identical infinitely lived 
consumers each endowed with one unit of labor per period. Consumers have no taste 
for leisure and inelastically supply their labor to the market at the prevailing wage 
rate. Therefore, in each period, the labor supply is equal to L. 
2.2.1 Preferences and Demand 
Consumers derive their utility from the consumption of varieties produced in a single 
industry. The industry is interpreted as consisting of a narrowly defined product class 
that addresses specific needs and admits a fair amount of differentiation (e.g. the 
automobile industry). It is composed of multiple v rtically differentiated market 
segments characterized by a unique level of quality – the pr cise meaning of which 
will be discussed at length below – within which producers can develop horizontally 
differentiated varieties.10 In equilibrium, a measure Nii )}p, (X{X ∈ω≡  of 
commodities, defined on the set of quality (or market segments, N) and price (p) is 
available for consumption. The number of segments as well as the segment-specific 
quality levels ( i ω ) are assumed to be constant over time and exogenously 
determined. For simplicity, the analysis considers the case of two market segments; 
which are called high quality (Hω ) and low quality ( oω ). 
                                                
10 The terms horizontal and vertical have a different meaning here than in the multinational firms 
literature. In the current context, the firm’s outpt within a specific product category is differentiated 
along two dimensions: horizontal and vertical. For instance, consider the auto industry. Autos exhibit 
vertical differentiation (the Honda Civic and Bentley Continental are not directed at the same 
consumer base) and horizontal differentiation within segment (the Toyota Tercel competes for the 




 Preferences over the differentiated varieties are additively separable with weights 
defined by the quality of the commodity. This implies that all varieties of the same 
quality and trading at the same price are consumed at the same rate. The composite 
good Q is a version of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator extended to allow for 














− , (1) 
where )x(q  and )x(ω  represent the consumption and the quality of variety x. Since 
all consumers are identical and there is no asset accumulation, there is no borrowing 
and lending. The optimal level of consumption of each commodity is chosen to 
minimize the cost of acquiring the aggregate Q, which implies that: 
ε1 p(x))x(ωRPq(x) −−ε= , (2)
where PQR =  denotes aggregate expenditure, 1)1(1ε >ρ−≡  is the price elasticity 
of substitution between varieties and P is the ideal aggregate quality-adjusted price 



















ii dxp(x)ωΨ . (3)
Note that iΨ  is negatively related to a weighted sum of varieties’ prices and 
positively related to the segment’s quality. It will be interpreted as the segment’s 
price-adjusted quality index. 
 The representation of preferences given in (1) lends itself to the interpretation of 
multiple segments within a single industry. Indeed, consumers see varieties of 




fine with consuming, say, only high quality varieties. The share of total expenditure 
on each of the segments is endogenous and the revenue in each segment can be 














where )}p,(X{X ii  ω≡  is the mass of varieties of quality i available for c nsumption. 
Since the distribution of demand for varieties across segments depends on the relative 
competitiveness of each segment this characterization of preferences introduces an 
additional adjustment margin that allows consumers to influence the types of goods 
produced in equilibrium. When the segment’s price-adjusted quality index ( iΨ ) is 
relatively high, the share of expenditure that goes t  that particular segment will also 
be relatively high.11 Finally, all else equal, the preferences defined in (1) imply that it 
takes a smaller mass of high quality varieties (HX ) than low quality varieties ( oX ) to 
attain a given level of utility. Hence, intuitively, consumers are willing to sacrifice 
diversity to obtain quality. 
The optimal demand schedule, defined in (2), reveals that the quantity demanded 
of each variety is decreasing in the price of the variety (p) and increasing in industry 
size (R) and aggregate price (P) – all standard results in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
taste for variety model. One difference, however, is the presence of the quality index 
(ω), which acts as a demand shifter. Conditional on price and industry characteristics 
(P, Q and ε ), the quantity demanded is increasing in the quality of the commodity if 
and only if Ho ω<ω . This assumption will be maintained for the rest of the chapter. 
                                                





2.2.2 Technology and Firm Behavior 
The quality of the output depends on the technology used in its production.12 For 
convenience, assume that only two technologies are available: a basic or “low” 
technology that can be acquired at low fixed cost (of ) to produce varieties of low 
quality ( oω ), and an advanced or “high” technology that can be acquired at high fixed 
cost ( oH ff > ) to produce varieties of high quality ( oH ωω > ).
13 In order to obtain 
tractable results, mild assumptions are imposed on these technologies: First, the 
characteristics of both technologies are common knowledge to all potential entrants in 
the industry. Second, both technologies are available for purchase to all firms. Thus, 
ex-ante, each firm can potentially enter either market segment. Third, conditional on 
technology choice, the quality of production is independent of other firm-level 
characteristics. Hence, it is possible to define a one-to-one mapping between the set 
of technologies and the set of product qualities. Fourth, the general form of the total 
cost function is the same for both technologies and is given by: 
                                                
12 A number of “technology adoption” models have recently been developed in an international trade 
context. For instance, in a recent empirical study, Bustos (2007) extends Melitz’s model to allow firms 
to choose between a high fixed cost, low marginal cost technology and a low fixed cost, high marginal 
cost technology, and uses the framework to evaluate the impact of trade on technology upgrading and 
demand for skilled labor. Yeaple (2005) combines technology adoption and labor force heterogeneity 
to generate an endogenous distribution of firm productivity. These models differ from the current study 
on two important dimensions. First, in these studies the choice of technology has an impact on the 
production cost, but has no direct influence on the quality of the output and the consumer’s willingness 
to pay. Second, in the current study a high fixed cost does not lead to a low marginal cost. Both costs 
are increasing in quality. This assumption follows the industrial organization literature starting with 
Spence (1976). 
13 When multiple technologies can be used to produce the same quality some complications arise. For 
instance, consider the case when two different technologies can be used to produce varieties of the 
same quality. To be relevant, the technology with the higher fixed cost must be associated with a lower 
marginal cost. If this is the case, each technology will be perceived as the most profitable by a certain 
range of firms. Those with low productivity will choose the low fixed cost, high marginal cost 
















+=ϕ ,     with Ho ff <  and Ho cc < ,  (4)
where the subscript i indexes the technology, or equivalently the quality of 
production, ϕ  is a measure of firm-level productivity, and w is the common wage rate 
hereafter normalized to one. This formulation implies that, within each segment i, all 
firms share the same labor overhead cost (if ), but the variable cost ( ϕic ) is 
decreasing in firm-level productivity (φ). This captures the idea that the acquisition 
cost of each technology is the same for all firms but that, as a result of efficient 
management, firms operated by high ability entrepreneurs will be better able to 
exploit the technology and achieve lower marginal costs relative to firms managed by 
entrepreneurs of lesser ability. Finally, both the fix d and constant marginal cost of 
production are assumed to increase in quality such that producing quality is costly. 
 Firms are assumed to be single-plant, single-product profit maximizers. As a 
result, they will set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. This leads to the 





)(p ii . (5)
Thus, mill-pricing with a constant mark-up over marginal cost is optimal for all firms. 
In standard Melitz type models firms have heterogeneous productivity but quality is 
homogeneous across firms and marginal costs are normalized to one (i.e. 1ci = ).
14 As 
a result prices are given by )(ρ1)p( ϕ=ϕ  and more productive firms always charge 
lower prices. In contrast to the benchmark formulation, the extended model allows the 
                                                
14 In the Melitz model higher productivity can also be interpreted as producing a higher quality variety 




schedule of unit prices to be increasing across market segments. Therefore, as long as 
more productive firms produce higher quality varieties and the effect of quality 
upgrading dominates the direct influence of productivity on price, more productive 
firms will charge higher prices per unit. 
 Using the pricing rule (5) and the optimal demand schedule defined in (2), the 




−ϕ=ϕ ,     where ε1iii cωΩ
−≡ . (6)
Hence, for any given level of productivity (φ), revenue is increasing in the aggregate 
expenditure (R) and the aggregate price index (P). By definition, the firm’s segment 










where the last equality uses equations (4)-(6). Firms will produce if and only if profits 
are non-negative. Since profits are increasing in productivity there exists a 
productivity threshold, i ϕ , above which firms find it profitable to produce a vriety 


























This equation indicates, in particular, that the profitability cutoff i ϕ  is increasing in 
fixed costs ( if ) and decreasing in the segment specific component of revenue ( iΩ ).  
 Examples of the profit functions defined in (7) are depicted in Figure 1 in 




for the high segment (Hϕ ) is lower than that of the low segment (oϕ ) as illustrated by 
the curves },{ Ho π′π . Similarly, it could be the case that all firms prefer to produce a 
low quality variety as illustrated by the },{ Ho π′′π  case. In both cases every incumbent 
prefers the same market segment such that all varieties produced and consumed in 















Figure 1: Profit Functions and Productivity Cutoffs 
  
To make the model interesting, conditions that rule out such specialization in one 
market segment are required. The first step is to find the productivity level oHϕ  at 
which a firm is indifferent between producing a low or a high quality variety. 
Formally, let the transition productivity cutoff oHϕ  satisfy )()( oHHoHo ϕπ=ϕπ  so that 
from (7) and (8): 






















This equation clearly shows that the productivity of the marginal firm in the high 
segment ( oHϕ ) is proportional to the productivity of the marginal firm in the low 
segment ( oϕ ). Furthermore, the proportionality factor, ∆, is exogenously fixed by the 
model’s parameters and, as one would expect, is increasing in the percentage change 
in fixed cost from upgrading from the low to the hig  quality segment, and decreasing 
in the associated percentage change in revenue. 
  By definition both qualities are produced in equilibrium if and only if 1>∆ . This 
requires that two conditions are met: (i) the percentage difference in fixed cost 
between high and low quality is greater than the percentage difference in revenue, or 
equivalently oHoH ff<ΩΩ ; (ii) conditional on productivity, the revenue earned in 
the high segment is greater than that earned in the low segment, so that oH1 ΩΩ< . 
If condition (i) is not satisfied, 1<∆  and every firm finds it optimal to produce in the 
high segment since the extra revenue earned from upgrading more than covers the 
extra fixed cost associated with the higher technology. If condition (ii) is not satisfied, 
the transition productivity cutoff oHϕ  is negative. In that case, the revenue earned in 
the low segment is higher for every firm and it is never optimal to upgrade to the high 
technology. Revenue is increasing in quality only if marginal costs are sufficiently 




Henceforth, conditions (i) and (ii) are assumed to be satisfied such that: 
 





 The presence of fixed costs implies that firms will choose to produce a unique 
variety, different from the varieties produced by all other firms in the same segment. 
Moreover, since firms are profit maximizers, they will produce in segment j only if 
segment j provides them with the highest conditional profit, formally if 
}}H,o{j,ifor  ),()(:j { ij ∈ϕπ≥ϕπ , and if their revenue at least covers the cost 
associated with production in that segment, 0)(j ≥ϕπ . When varieties of both 
qualities are produced in equilibrium, firm behavior can be described as follows: exit 
if oϕ<ϕ , produce a low quality variety if ),[ oHo ϕϕ∈ϕ , and produce a high quality 
variety if oHϕ≥ϕ . This corresponds to the },{ Ho ππ  case illustrate in Figure 1. 
 This section explained how vertical differentiation introduces a new adjustment 
margin available to the firm. Since within each segm nt the increase in firm-level 
profit is limited by the decreasing marginal utility of consumers, as the firm becomes 
more productive the gain from increasing sales by decreasing price becomes less 
important than the gain from switching to a higher quality market segment. As a 
result, highly productive firms will choose to acquire an expensive technology and 
produce high quality products. 
2.2.3 Quality 
The core assumption of the above framework is that firms can choose the position of 
their demand curve in the quantity-price space. By investing in an expensive 
technology and paying more per unit produced, firms effectively purchase a positive 
demand shift which, for simplicity, is called quality. In the current context, quality 




price, that have a direct influence on demand and that can be controlled (or at least 
influenced) by the firm.15 These factors can be classified in two broad categori s. The 
first includes intangible characteristics, such as the consumer’s perception of the 
product, brand recognition, after sale service, warranty, reliability, or availability. The 
second includes tangible characteristics, such as better design or materials which 
increase the performance and durability of the product. Both types of characteristics 
increase the service flow obtained from the product, thereby raising the consumer’s 
willingness to pay. 
2.2.4 Industry Equilibrium 
This subsection characterizes the economy’s equilibri m. Entry is assumed to be 
costly as product development and production start up costs must be disbursed. The 
entry cost is the same for all potential entrants ad is denoted ef . Prior to entering the 
industry the firm does not know its productivity. Thus, the value of the investment 
opportunity is learned only once the fixed entry cost is sunk and the firm learns its 
productivity, φ, which is assumed to be a random draw from the distribution )(G ϕ  on 
support ),1[ ∞⊆Φ . Once the firm learns its productivity, it can decide to exit the 
industry immediately or develop and produce a variety in its preferred market 
segment. 
 Since profits are increasing in productivity and firms stay in the industry only if 
profits are non-negative, free entry determines a productivity threshold below which 
firms will decide to exit the industry. Given the assumption on technology, less 
                                                
15 Firms may be able to perfectly control their expenditures on advertising but they cannot perfectly 




profitable firms will choose to produce low quality varieties. The equilibrium 
profitability threshold is therefore equal to the cutoff for the low segment (oϕ ). The 
zero-profit condition that determines this threshold is given by: 
0)( oo =ϕπ      ⇔      ooo f)(r ε=ϕ .  (10)
Firms that draw an ability below the profitability hreshold will exit the industry. 
Those drawing ability above will engage in profitable production. 
 Each period producing firms face a probability δ  of being hit by an exogenous 
shock that will force them to exit the industry. Henc , the value of the firm is zero if it 
draws a productivity below the profitability threshold and exits, and equal to the 
stream of future profits discounted by the probability of exit if it draws an ability 
above the cutoff value and produces. Since profit is the same in every period, the 
























t   
where t is the time index. 
 The ex-post probability density function for productivity, )µ(ϕ , is conditional on 
successful entry and is truncated at the profitability cutoff ( oϕ ). To obtain closed 
form solutions some structure needs to be put on the productivity distribution. It is 
therefore assumed that productivity is distributed Pareto.16  Therefore, the ex-ante 
cumulative distribution function is given by σ−ϕ−=ϕ 1)G(  where }1ε,2max{σ −>  is 
                                                
16 The Pareto distribution is tractable and provides a reasonable approximation to the actual 
productivity distribution; see Cabral and Mata (2003) for evidence. It is therefore widely used in the
literature; see for instance Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 
(2007). By definition of the Pareto distribution, an increase in the shape parameter σ decreases both the 
mean and the variance of the productivity and 2σ >  is required to ensure a finite variance. The 




a parameter that affects the shape of the distribution. Under these assumptions, the 
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  There exists an unbounded set of potential entrants in the industry. Firms will 
attempt entry in the industry as long as the expected value from entry is greater then 
the sunk entry cost ef . Since the characteristics of the ex-ante distribu ion of 
productivity )(G ϕ  are assumed to be common knowledge, the expected value of 
entry ( EV ) is identical for all potential entrants and is given by the product of the 
average incumbent’s value )π( δ  and the probability of successful entry eζ . As a 










 The specific properties of the Pareto distribution imply that the relative output of 
high quality varieties produced in equilibrium is unaffected by the value the 
productivity cutoff.17 As a result, the average revenue of producing firms is not 
affected by the cutoff either and can be expressed as a function of preferences, 
technology and distribution parameters alone; see th  appendix for details: 
                                                
17 Any continuous slice of the Pareto is itself a Pareto with the same shape parameter. It is this 




































 −+≡ . (12)
This equation shows that the average revenue is increasing in the threshold revenue 
( ofε ) and the percentage increase in revenue associated wi h quality upgrading. 
Further, average revenue is decreasing in ∆, the ratio of threshold productivities for 
high and low quality production, since a higher ∆ reduces the fraction of firms 














σ f∆f)∆1(f −− +−=  represent the average fixed production cost and ∆  is 
defined as in (9). Taking (13) into account, the fre entry condition (11) can be 
expressed as a function of only one endogenous variable, the profitability threshold 











As illustrated in Figure 2, the expected value of entry is monotonically decreasing in 
the profitability threshold. Thus, the free entry condition alone pins down the 
equilibrium value of the threshold as a function of the parameters of the model. From 




























































Proposition 1. There exists a unique closed economy equilibrium. 
Proof: See appendix. □
 
 The equilibrium profitability threshold, ∗ϕo , is increasing in average profit and 
decreasing in the probability of exit (δ ) and the fixed entry cost (ef ). A decrease in 
the probability of exit increases the expected value of entry which, all else equal, 
increases the mass of entrants in the industry. From (3) this increase leads to a 
reduction in the price index and, as a result, a decrease in firm-level revenue. This 
decrease in profitability forces the less productive firms to exit the industry, thereby 
increasing the equilibrium threshold productivity and decreasing the expected value 









Figure 2: The Equilibrium Productivity Threshold 
 
 The equilibrium mass of producing firms in the industry (M) can be obtained by 

















 −+= , (16)
where Λ is defined in (12). It follows that the equilibrium mass of incumbents is fixed 
and proportional to the size of the industry (R). The equilibrium threshold and mass 
of incumbents can be used to obtain an expression for the equilibrium price index 

































σ1 ∆)∆1( Ω+Ω−≡θ ε−+ε−+ , and ∆, Λ , and ∗ϕo  are defined in (9), (12) and 
(15) respectively. This expression makes clear that the price index is increasing in the 
markup ( /ρ1 ) but decreasing in the productivity threshold (oϕ ) and industry size (R). 
Intuitively, when the markup is high all varieties are more expensive whereas an 
increase in productivity will decrease the (quality adjusted) price of varieties. An 
increase in industry size (R) will increase the number of varieties available for 
consumption which, because of consumers’ taste for variety, decreases the price 
index. 
 By definition, in a stationary equilibrium, every aggregate variable must remain 
constant over time. This requires a mass of new entrants in each period, such that the 
mass of successful entrants exactly replaces the mass of incumbents hit by the 
exogenous shock and forced to exit. Formally, this aggregate stability condition 




affected by this dynamic entry/exit process, since the successful entrants and failing 
incumbents have the same productivity distribution.  
Finally, the labor used for investment purposes by entrants must be reflected in 
the accounting for aggregate labor and affects the aggregate labor available for 
production. In equilibrium it must be the case that pe LLL += , where pL  is the 
aggregate labor used by incumbents for production purposes and eL  denotes 
aggregate labor used for investment purposes by prospective entrants. Aggregate 
payments to production workers must match the difference between aggregate 
revenue and profit in every segment. Normalizing the wage rate to one without loss of 
generality, this implies that ΠRL p −= , where R and Π denote aggregate revenue 
and profit, respectively. Moreover, aggregate payments to investment workers must 
satisfy eee fML = . Using the aggregate stability condition ( MM ee δ=ζ ), and the free 
entry condition ( σoeδfπ ϕ= ) this implies that Π=π== MfML eee . Then revenue 
must equal total payments to labor since LΠLLLR pep =+=+= , so that revenue is 
exogenously fixed by the size of the country. 
 The characterization of the unique stationary equilibrium in the closed economy is 
now complete. The next section analyzes this equilibrium, contrasts its implications 
with existing models and highlights the model’s novel predictions related to product 





2.3. Analysis of Equilibrium 
In this section, a number of important properties of the closed economy equilibrium 
are explored. To emphasis the novel implications of the additional adjustment margin 
(quality), assumption 1 is maintained throughout the section. Moreover, some of the 
results depend on the relationship between the elasticity of substitution (ε) and the 
shape parameter of the productivity distribution (σ). To obtain well behaved results 
the following additional assumption is required: 
 
Assumption 2. ε>σ . 
 
Appendix A contains an extensive discussion of this as umption. When it fails to hold 
the model generates unintuitive results. For instance, the relative output of the high to 
the low quality segment output is increasing in the transition threshold productivity. 
2.3.1 Sorting and Optimal Output 
As shown in Figure 1, in equilibrium lower productivity firms choose to produce low 
quality varieties, while higher productivity firms produce high quality varieties. 
Intuitively, since higher productivity firms face lower marginal costs they can charge 
lower prices and sell a larger number of units. This allows them to overcome both 
“barriers” to quality: the increase in the fixed cost f technology (f) and the increase 
in marginal production cost (c). 
 
Proposition 2. There is endogenous sorting of firms across quality such that 
higher productivity firms choose to produce high quality varieties. 




 As indicated by equation (16), the mass of firms is proportional to the size of the 
industry and average revenue. The proportionality factor is function of the 
preferences, technology and distribution parameters. In particular, 
 
Proposition 3. Any change in parameters that increases the relative 
profitability of the high quality segment (an increase in Λ defined in (12)) will 
reduce the equilibrium mass of firms. 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
This suggests that, in countries where taste for quality is pronounced or the relative 
cost of producing high quality varieties is low, the number of firms will be small but 
firms will be relatively large. In terms of the model, an increase in the fraction of high 
quality varieties will increase the average revenue. Holding the aggregate revenue 
fixed, the mass of incumbents must go down to maintain the equilibrium. Intuitively, 
since quality and variety are substitutable, consumers will be satisfied will less 
variety when the average quality is higher. 
 From the optimal demand (2), the pricing rule (5), and the equilibrium condition 
(10), it can be shown that the equilibrium firm level output is given as follows; see 





























where oϕ  is defined (15). Therefore, output is increasing i the markup (1/ρ) and 




reduces the number of producing firms thereby increasing the demand for the 
incumbent’s output. An increase in the productivity threshold ( oϕ ) increases 
competition in the industry by inducing a decrease in the price index (P). The relative 
price of variety is higher, so that the demand is lower. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of firm level output as a function of productivity. 
Two important features should be noted. First, since all else equal high quality firms 
face higher demand, there is a discontinuity in output at the margin between 
segments, which is at the transition productivity oHϕ . From (18), the ratio of high 
quality to low quality output at oHϕ  is given by oH1 ΩΩ< , where the inequality 
follows from assumption 1. Second, a change in productivity has a greater impact on 
output for firms in the high quality segment. In other words the slope of the quantity 
schedule is greater in the high segment. This happens b cause a small decrease in 
price associated with an increase in productivity will increase the demand relatively 
more for firms producing high quality varieties. It follows that: 
 
Proposition 4. Plant size, as measured by units of output or revenue, is 
unambiguously increasing in firm productivity (φ). 
Proof: See appendix. □
 
Finally, note that combining proposition 2 and 4 implies that quality and firm size (as 
measured either by output or revenue) are positively correlated.18 
 
                                                
18 This is potentially a counter-intuitive prediction f the model that does not fit some industries. For 

























Figure 3: Equilibrium Firm-level Output Schedule 
 
 Using (18) it is possible to obtain expressions for aggregate output within each 
segment as functions of the parameters of the model and the endogenous productivity 










































































where oO  and HO  denote the total output of the high and low segments respectively 
and Λ is defined in (12). Both expressions in (19) are increasing in the country size 
(L) and decreasing in the maximum price of a low quality variety ( oo ρc ϕ ), so that 
large, low cost countries will produce more units of differentiated goods. Using (18), 























A few important points are worth noting: First, the ratio is independent of the 
threshold productivity. This is due to the specific properties of the Pareto distribution 
and would not be the case in general. Second, country size (L) as no impact on the 
average quality of output. Third, the relative output depends positively on the relative 
revenue oH ΩΩ  and, through ∆, negatively on relative fixed cost oH ff . Therefore, 
as expected, an increase in the relative profitabily of a segment increases the relative 
output of that segment. Finally, the ratio depends egatively on the shape parameter: 
 
Proposition 5. All else equal, an industry characterized by a high firm-level 
mean and variance of productivity (low σ) will produce relatively more high 
quality varieties. 
Proof: Direct from (20). □ 
 
This happens because a reduction in the shape parameter transfers mass from below 
the average to above the average. This increases the share of firms that find the high 
quality segment more profitable and raises the relativ  output of high quality goods. 
2.3.2 Industry Price Schedule 
From the optimal pricing rule (5), it is clear that within each market segment, firm-
level price is decreasing in productivity. Therefor, the highest (lowest) price charged 
for a quality j commodity will be the optimal price s t by the least (most) productive 
firm using technology j. Further, because Hc is strictly greater than oc  there is a 




productivity oHϕ . Thus, a key feature of the industry’s price schedul , illustrated in 
Figure 4, is its nonlinearity. An important implication of this nonlinearity is that it 








Figure 4: Industry Price Schedule 
 







































































where iβ , }3 ,2 ,1{i ∈  are different weighted averages of production costs. Several 
interesting features of this result are worth highlighting. First, the correlation between 
firm-level price and productivity is not a function f the profitability threshold. Again 




is a nonlinear function the shape parameter of the productivity distribution (σ). 
Unfortunately, given the complexity of equation (21), it is not possible to obtain 
simple, meaningful conditions under which the sign of the correlation is determinate. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to show that the derivative of the price-productivity 
correlation with respect to the shape parameter (σ) is positive when evaluated at the 
point where the correlation is zero. Therefore: 
 
Proposition 6. For any technology and taste parameters that satisfy the 
model’s assumptions, there exists a range of the shape parameter (σ) such 
that the correlation between firm-level price and productivity is positive. 
Proof: See appendix. □
 
Consider a given set of model parameters, and assume that the distribution of firms is 
such that the price-productivity correlation is zero. In that case, a small reduction in 
dispersion (i.e. a higher σ), will put more mass around the transition cutoff 
productivity oHϕ  and the correlation will be positive. 
2.3.3 Welfare 
Welfare effects can be evaluated by looking at the behavior of the inverse of the 
equilibrium aggregate price index. From (17) and the fact that LR = , aggregate 
































where Λ, oϕ , and θ are defined in (12), (15) and (17) respectively. Therefore, welfare 
is increasing in country size (L) and the productivity threshold ( oϕ ). This happens 
because more varieties are available for consumption in large countries and 
consumers value variety. All else equal, an increase in threshold productivity implies 
an increase in average productivity, which leads to lower prices and higher welfare. 
By extension, since the ex post mean and variance of productivity are increasing in 
the threshold, this implies that welfare will be higher when the mean and the 
dispersion of productivity are high (low σ). 
 This concludes the analysis of the unique closed economy equilibrium. In the next 
section the model is extended to include multiple countries. The set-up will then be 
used to study the impact of trade on the characteristics of the industry. 
 
2.4 The Open Economy Model 
This section extends the framework developed in the last section to obtain a model of 
a trading world composed of 1n +  identical countries of the type previously 
described. When all countries are identical, they all share the same aggregate 
variables. Since it greatly simplifies the analysis thi  assumption is maintained for the 
remainder of the chapter. It is important to note, however, that since the number of 
countries is variable, the size of the domestic country relative to the rest of the world 




2.4.1 Costless Trade 
If there are no trade costs, the consumers’ love for variety implies that firms will 
divide their sales between domestic and foreign markets based on the size of their 
country relative to the world economy. Since all countries are identical, trade will be 
balanced, as each country will send the same fraction of each variety to each of the 
other countries. Thus, firms are not affected by costless trade but consumers enjoy 
greater welfare as they gain access to greater product variety. Moreover, 
 
Proposition 7. When trading partners are symmetric, the equilibrium 
profitability threshold is unaffected by a move from autarky to free trade. 
Proof: See appendix. □
 
Intuitively, as the economy is opened to costless trade, all firms in the industry – 
irrespective of their productivity – experience increased demand for their products in 
export markets and reduced demand in domestic market. In the case of symmetric 
countries, the gain from trade associated with foreign market access is just equal to 
the loss from trade due to the entry of foreign firms in the domestic market.  
2.4.2 Costly Trade 
The assumption of costless trade does not accord well with empirical observations; 
see Roberts and Tybout (1997) for instance. In order to sell their products in foreign 
markets, firms must build and maintain relations with foreign distributors. Moreover, 
firms generally face tariff barriers and pay freight costs to send their products to 




export cost (xf ) that must be paid every period by exporting firms, and a constant 
melting-iceberg cost per-unit shipped to foreign countries. Precisely, if 1>τ  units are 
shipped to the foreign country, only one unit arrives. These costs are assumed 
common to every market segment so that arbitrary difference in trade costs do not 
drive any of the results.  
The increase in marginal cost will be reflected by a proportional increase in price 
such that the pricing rule for exported varieties is: 
)(p )(p i
x
i ϕτ=ϕ , (22)
where )(p i ϕ , defined in (5), and )(p
x
i ϕ  respectively denote the domestic and foreign 
price of a domestically produced variety. Using this result in the optimal demand 
defined in (2), it follows that the additional revenue from export to any foreign 





where )(ri ϕ , the domestic revenue, is defined in (6). Similarly, the additional profit 











This implies that the total profit of a domestic producer is dependent on its exporting 
status as follow: )}(πnmax{0,)(π)(π xi
d
ii ϕ+ϕ=ϕ , where the profit from domestic 
sales, )(πdi ϕ , is defined in (7). Note that in the open economy the ideal price index, 
defined in (3), must include imported varieties:19  
                                                


























ϕϕµϕτϕ+ϕϕµϕϕ= ∫∫ , (24)
where M defines the mass of domestic incumbents while MM xx ξ≡  denotes the mass 
of exporting firms, and where )](G1[)](G1[ o
x
ox ϕ−ϕ−≡ξ  denotes the probability of 
exporting conditional on producing. The total mass of firms competing in any 
country, or equivalently the total mass of varieties available for consumption in any 
country, is thus given by M)n1(M xT ξ+= . 
 Consumers’ love for variety and the presence of fixed export costs ensure that no 
firm will export without also producing for its domestic market. Also since trade 
barriers are symmetric across countries, if a firm nds exporting to one of the foreign 
markets profitable, it will export to all countries. Thus, each firm now faces four 
different options: (i) produce a low quality variety and sell exclusively in the 
domestic market; (ii) produce a low quality variety and export; (iii) produce a high 
quality variety and sell exclusively in the domestic market; (iv) produce a high 
quality variety and export. Define the export productivity threshold xiϕ  as the 
minimum level of productivity required to be profitable in the export market, 




i =ϕ . From the 



























These thresholds are decreasing in the market size (R), the aggregate price index (P) 




However, the number of trading partners (n) has no impact on the export productivity 






− . Therefore, if a low quality firm finds it profitable to 
export, every high quality firm will find it profitable to export. Further, since the ratio 
of the export to the domestic cutoff is given by 1)/(ε1ixi
x
i )ffτ(
−=ϕϕ , partitioning of 
firms by export status within a segment can occur only if ix
1ε ffτ >− , a condition more 
likely to hold in the low segment given that Ho ff <  by assumption. These results 
imply that there can be selection of firms along exporting status in at most one market 
segment. The analysis focuses on the equilibrium where both high and low quality 
varieties are exported. Formally, this requires that: 


















Under this assumption the productivity cutoffs are o dered as follows: oH
x
oo ϕ<ϕ<ϕ . 
Together, assumptions 1 and 3 ensure that there is sort ng across market segments and 
selection along exporting status. The behavior of firms conditional on productivity in 
this type of equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5. As productivity increases, firms 
expand their potential consumer base by exporting their production to foreign markets 






Exit Low, Domestic Low, Exporter High, Exporter
 




 The exogenous factors affecting the entry/exit process and the productivity 
distribution are the same as in the closed economy. In particular, producing firms face 
a probability δ  of being hit by an exogenous shock that will force th m to exit the 
industry. Therefore, the value of the firm in a costly trade world is zero if the firm 
exits and equal to the discounted sum of profits if it produces. Hence the value of the 








ϕπ=ϕ )(,0max)(V ,     with )}()(),()(),(max{)( xHH
x
ooo ϕπ+ϕπϕπ+ϕπϕπ=ϕπ  
where )(i ϕπ  is defined in (7) and )(
x
i ϕπ  is defined in (23). As in the closed economy 
firms will enter the industry until the expected value of entry is equal to the cost of 
















d)(µ)(ππ xxx  (26)
and where )µ()()(µ xex ϕξξ≡ϕ  denotes the probability density function of 
productivity conditional on exporting. The costly trade economy expected value of 
entry is equal to the closed economy expected value, defined in equation (11), plus 
the expected additional discounted profit realized in the export market ( δπζζ xxe n ).  
 As in the closed economy equilibrium, it is possible to express the average profit 
earned in the export market as a function of the model’s parameters alone; see the 





















where ε−+∆∆ΩΩ−Ω+≡Λ σ1xooHx )]()([1 , and ∆ and x∆  are defined in (9) and 
assumption 3 respectively. Thus average export profit is increasing in the fixed trade 
cost and in the ratio of the marginal exporter’s productivity to the marginal entrant’s 
productivity ( x∆ ). Taking this result into account, the free entry condition (26) can be 
expressed as a function of only one endogenous variable, the equilibrium profitability 











As in the closed economy, the free entry condition alone pins down the equilibrium 
value of the threshold as a function of the parameters of the model. It can be shown 
that: 
 
Proposition 8. There exists a unique costly trade open economy equilibrium.  
Proof: See appendix. □
 
 It is also possible to express the average revenue of producing firms as a function 



















=ϕϕϕ≡ ∫  (29)
where Λ is defined in (12) and xΛ  is defined in (27). Thus the average revenue is the 
sum of domestic revenue, defined in (12), and the product of a function of trade 
impediments and average revenue from export. Since all countries are identical, trade 




each country. Thus, as in the closed economy, the equilibrium mass of incumbents 

















 −+== . (30)
Finally, the equilibrium profitability threshold and mass of incumbents can be used in 





































−−ε−−ε−−ε− ∆Ω+−∆Ωτξ+θ≡θ . As in the closed economy, in a 
stationary equilibrium, the aggregate variables must remain constant over time. This 
requires a mass ( eM ) of new entrants in each period, such that the mass of successful 
entrants ( eeMζ ) exactly replaces the mass of incumbents ( Mδ ) hit by the exogenous 
shock and forced to exit. This aggregate stability condition requires: MM ee δ=ζ .  
This completes the characterization of the unique costly trade open economy 
equilibrium. The following two sections use this framework to study the impact of 
trade and trade liberalization. 
 
2.5 The Impact of Trade 
The open economy model developed in the previous section can be used to study the 
effects of changes in trade policy in the presence of xport costs, firm heterogeneity, 
and quality differentiation. This section studies the effects of trade by comparing the 




incremental changes in trade impediments once the economy is open. Since both 
analyses compare different steady states, they should be interpreted as the long run 
economic impact of trade and trade liberalization. Incorporating decisions about 
endogenous product quality introduces an additional adjustment margin along which 
firms can respond to trade liberalization. Examination of this new channel yields a 
number of novel implications. 
 An important message of the open economy free entry condition (26) is that, since 
the cost of entry in the industry (ef ) is unchanged by trade, the equilibrium expected 
value of the firm will be the same as in the closed economy. Hence, whenever xπ  is 
positive, the equilibrium profitability threshold is greater in the costly trade 
equilibrium than in the closed economy. This implies that moving from autarky to 
costly trade increases the average productivity of firms in the industry. This occurs 
for two related reasons. First, trade offers new profit opportunities for the more 
productive incumbents that decide to enter the export markets. Second, trade raises 
the expected value of entry, thereby increasing the mass of successful entrants. This 
leads to an increase in demand for labor. Since the supply of labor is fixed the wage 
rate goes up and the marginally profitable firms are fo ced to exit the industry. 
 Since ∆ is unaffected by costly trade, the increase in the profitability threshold 
( oϕ ) leads to a proportional increase in the transition productivity cutoff ( oHϕ ).The 
adjustment can take two forms. First, if switching between segments is costless the 
pre-trade marginally profitable firms in the high segment go down the quality ladder 
and start producing a low quality variety. Second, if firms cannot change segments 




produce a low quality variety. This last scenario implies that trade induces exit of 
some relatively productive firms that were marginally profitable in the high quality 
segment in addition to the marginally profitable low quality firms. 
 Trade also has an impact on the average quality of output. The appendix shows 

























where iO  represents total output of quality i. Note that if he variable trade cost is 
prohibitive ( ∞→τ ) or if all firms export ( 1∆x = ) this ratio is the same as the closed 
economy ratio defined in (20). However, as long as both qualities are exported 
( ∆<x∆ ) and transport costs are non-trivial ( 1>τ ), the relative output of high quality 
varieties is greater under costly trade than in the closed economy. 
 Further, comparing equations (12) and (29) reveals that the average revenue per 
producing firm is generally greater under costly trade than in autarky. When trade is 
allowed, the more productive firms enter the export market and increase their 
production. Since the optimal price (net of trade cost) is unaffected by trade the 
increase in output leads to an increase in revenue. Hence, since the revenue of the 
most productive firms goes up while low productivity, low revenue firms exit the 
market, average revenue increases. Moreover, since the total revenue in each market 
(R) is unaffected by costly trade, the increase in average revenue implies that the 
mass of incumbents is lower under costly trade than under autarky. Meanwhile, the 












= − . (33)
Therefore while costly trade increases the relative output of high quality varieties, it 
has no effect on the relative number of firms in each segment. Finally, using (16) and 
(30), and taking into account the fact that the mass of producers TM  is equal to 
M)n1( xξ+ , it can be shown that the decrease in the number of incumbents due to a 
more competitive job market is more important than the increase due to the entry of 
exporters. Therefore, the overall mass of firms competing in each country is lower 
under costly trade than under autarky. Intuitively this happens because a small 
number of exporters enter the foreign market relative o the number of incumbents 
forced to exit. 
 The effects of a move from autarky to costly trade ar  summarized in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 9: As long as there is selection in the export market and varieties 
of both qualities are exported, a move from autarky to costly trade: 
(i) increases average revenue, profit, and productivity per producing 
firm. 
(ii)  reduces the mass of incumbents producing in each country (both 
overall and within each segment). 
(iii)  reduces the overall mass of firms competing in each country or, 
equivalently, reduces the overall mass of varieties available for 
consumption in each country. 




(v) increases the industry-level relative output of the high quality segment. 
(vi) increases the average quality of varieties available for consumption in 
each country. 
Proof. See appendix. □
 
 Another interesting point to note is that, since only a fraction of firms export, the 
average quality of exported varieties is not the same s that of varieties produced for 
the domestic market. It can be shown that the share of high quality varieties in the 
total quantity of exports is higher than the share of high quality varieties sold 





















where kjO  denotes the total domestic output of quality j varieties sold in market k, 
where }X,D{k ∈ . Therefore: 
 
Proposition 10: Under costly trade, when there is selection in the export 
market, the average quality of exported products is higher than the average 
quality of varieties produced for domestic sale. 
Proof: See appendix. □
 
This implies that trade leads to an increase in the average quality of production and 




Finally, the effect of costly trade on welfare can be evaluated by looking at the 
change in the price index defined in (31). Costly trade affects welfare through 
multiple channels. On the one hand, following the introduction of costly trade, the 
mass of varieties available in each market will decrease. On the other hand, 
consumers gain access to higher quality products on average. Since these effects work 
in opposite directions, the overall impact of costly trade on welfare is ambiguous. 
 
2.6 The Impact of Trade Liberalization 
While studying the transition from autarky to trade is a useful analytical exercise and 
provides some benchmark results, more realistic comparative statics are obtained by 
studying the impact of trade liberalization on the margin. In the current context the 
latter can take three basic forms: a decrease in the iceberg cost (τ), a decrease in the 
fixed export cost (xf ), or an increase in the number of trading partners (n). This 
section study theses cases simultaneously and use the t rm trade liberalization to refer 
to any of these events.20 
 An important message of the open economy free entry condition (28) is that, since 
the cost of entry in the industry (ef ) is unaffected by trade costs, the equilibrium 
expected value of the firm is unaffected by trade lib ralization. From (27), trade 
liberalization increases average export profit and, from (13), has no impact on 
domestic average profit. From (28), these changes increase the expected value of 
entry for any value of the productivity threshold. Since ( ef ) is unchanged, this implies 
                                                
20 The comparative statics exercises assume that both the ex ante and ex post equilibrium are such that 




that trade liberalization will increase the equilibrum productivity cutoff, thereby 
inducing marginally profitable firms to exit.21 The impact of trade liberalization on 

















Figure 6: The Impact of Trade Liberalization 
 
 Since from (9) ∆ is unaffected by trade liberalization, the increase in the 
equilibrium threshold productivity implies that the transition productivity cutoff 
( oHϕ ) will also increase. Therefore trade liberalization, by making competition 
tougher in every market, induces some firms to move down the quality ladder. Trade 
liberalization also affects the export productivity threshold ( xoϕ ). On the one hand, it 
can be shown that a decrease in trade costs (either variable or fixed) decreases the 
threshold productivity above which firms become exporters.22 Since these changes 
reduce trade barriers, it becomes relatively easier and more profitable to export such 
                                                
21 The impact of changes in the fixed trade costs are complex and signing derivatives requires an 
additional assumption. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a decrease in fixed trade cost t 
increase the threshold is that the elasticity of substitution (ε) is greater than 2. 




that less productive firms decide to enter the export markets. On the other hand, an 
increase in the number of trading partners (n) will increase the profitability threshold 
above which firms can profitably export. This happens because, while such a change 
has no effect on trade costs, it increases the demand for labor by continuing exporters. 
This increase in competition for workers in the labor market forces marginally 
profitable firms to exit the export market. 
Using (32) it can be shown that an increase in the number of trading partners will 
increase the share of high quality varieties in total utput – varieties produced for 
domestic sale plus varieties produced for export. Recall that, from proposition 10, the 
average quality of exports is higher then the average quality of aggregate output. 
Therefore, an increase in the number of trading partners, which as will be 
demonstrated below increases the share of production for export, also increases the 
average quality of aggregate output. Further, again from (32), an increase in fixed 
trade costs will increase the average quality of output. Intuitively, this happens 
because low quality exporters exit the foreign market, thereby reducing the output of 
the low quality segment. Finally, the impact of a change in variable trade costs 
depends on the relationship between trade impediments, the demand elasticity and the 
shape parameter of the productivity distribution. However, it is possible to show that 
whenever trade impediments are large enough, an increase in the iceberg transport 
cost leads to an increase in the relative output of the high quality incumbents.23 The 
                                                
23 The share is increasing if and only if ])nτ1()nτ(∆[εσ εεεσx
−−− ++< , where the term in square 





mechanism by which transport costs affect quality is similar to that of changes in 
fixed trade costs. 
 The model also delivers some important predictions for the impact of trade 
liberalization on the average quality of exported varieties. The relative volume of 


























where XiO  represents total number of units of quality i produced for export. Changes 
in trade impediments will affect this ratio through their impact on x∆ , which governs 
the selection of firms into export status. Since this t reshold is independent of the 
number of trading partners (n), changes in n will have no effect on the quality 
composition of exports. However, a decrease in the iceberg cost (τ) or in the fixed 
trade cost (fx) will decrease x∆  and induce a decrease in the average quality of 
exports. Hence, there is a positive relationship betwe n average quality and trade 
costs (τ and fx). This is akin to the well-known Alchian-Allen “shipping the good 
apples out” paradigm.  
 The fraction of firm that exports is given by the probability of exporting 
conditional on producing, which in equilibrium is given by σxxζ
−∆= . Therefore the 
number of trading partners (n) has no effect on the share of exporting firms. However, 
a decrease in the iceberg cost (τ) or fixed trade costs (fx) will decrease x∆  and 
increase the share of exporting firms. Hence there is a negative relationship between 




share of exporting firms’ output that is produced for export rather than the domestic 









= , (36) 
Therefore the share of exporters’ output (xs ) for export is completely determined by 
the elasticity of substitution (ε), the number of trading partners (n) and the iceberg 
trade cost (τ). As one would expect, this share is increasing in the number of trading 
partners and decreasing in variable trade costs and the emand elasticity. Since all 
markets are symmetric, the opening of a new market will increase the share of 
production for export. A decrease in the iceberg cost l wers the relative price of 
foreign varieties, making them more attractive to consumers. Finally a decrease in 
elasticity raises the demand for imported goods because consumers are less sensitive 
to the increase in price due to transport costs. 
 From (30), it can be shown that the number of domestic incumbents producing in 
each market will go down as a result of trade liberalization. When trade is liberalized, 
competition in each market increases due to the entry of additional foreign varieties. 
This forces the least productive incumbents to exitthe industry. It can further be 
shown that a decrease in iceberg or fixed costs will lead to a decrease in the overall 
mass of firms competing in each market. This happens because the mass of entering 
exporters is smaller than the mass of low productivity firms that exit. The impact of 
an increase in the number of trading partners (n) on the overall mass of firms 
competing in each market is ambiguous. An increase in n implies an increase in the 
mass of high productivity firms. All else equal, this tends to increase the number of 




the entry of high productivity firms in each market increases the toughness of 
competition which leads to exit of less productive firms and reduces the number of 
firms competing in the market. 
 Since quality is generally not observable a growing number of empirical studies 
use unit value to make inferences about product quality.24 The average export price 





















































)(p . (37) 
Therefore, an increase in the number of trading partners will increase the profitability 
threshold ( oϕ ), thus reducing the average export price. A decrease in fixed trade costs 
has two offsetting effects, increasing the profitability threshold and decreasing the 
export threshold ( x∆ ); the overall impact is ambiguous. The effect of a reduction in 
variable trade costs is even more complex. First, it leads to a proportional reduction in 
export prices for all firms, thereby decreasing the av rage price. Second, it increases 
the profitability threshold thus increasing the aver ge productivity and decreasing the 
average price. Third, it decreases trade barriers (x∆ ), which leads to an increase in 
the fraction of low quality exporters and the averag price. When the first two effects 
dominate, there is a positive association between av rage export prices and variable 
trade costs. In the end the sign of the relationship depends in a complex way on the 
value of the parameters of the model. 
                                                
24 This includes among others Johnson (2008), Hallak and Sivadasan (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen 




 The effects of trade liberalization are summarized in the following proposition. 
The proposition focuses on a decrease in variable trade costs, since this is the 
parameter most readily affected by policy. 
 
Proposition 11. Trade liberalization, in the form of a decrease in u it export 
costs (τ), will: 
(i) increase average revenue and profit per firm. 
(ii)  Increase average industry productivity. 
(iii)  decrease the mass of domestic incumbents and the overall mass of 
firms competing in each market or, equivalently, decrease the total 
mass of products available for consumption in each market. 
(iv) lead to exit and firm-level quality downgrading. 
(v) increase the share of exporting firms and decrease the average 
productivity of exporting firms. 
(vi) increase the share of exporters’ output sent to foreign markets. 
(vii) decrease the average quality of exports. 
 Proof: See appendix. □
 
 Finally, the effect of trade liberalization on welfare can be assessed by looking at 







































where Λ , oϕ , x∆ , xΛ , and xθ  are defined in (12), (15), assumption 3, (27), and(31) 
respectively. Trade liberalization affects welfare through multiple channels. First it 
increases the average productivity of firms in the industry which raises welfare by 
decreasing the general level of prices. Second, since the average quality of imported 
varieties is higher than the average quality of domestic production, trade liberalization 
increases the average quality of output. However, by increasing competition in the 
industry, trade liberalization decreases the overall mass of varieties available for 
consumption. Since these effects work in opposite dir ctions, the overall impact of 
trade liberalization on welfare is ambiguous. Formally, these effects can be evaluated 
by taking derivatives of W with respect to n, τ and fx. However, due to the complexity 
of the resulting equations general conditions are not easy to interpret.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model that includes quality 
differentiation among heterogeneous firms. The model is used to analyze how 
international trade policy and quality differentiation interact to shape patterns of 
production and trade flows. Introducing endogenous product quality decisions yields 
important new implications and helps reconcile the t ory with the observed facts. 
First, conversely to the benchmark Melitz (2003) model, the framework predicts that 
relatively productive firms will choose to produce high quality varieties that, under 
certain conditions, they sell at relatively high prices. This finding accords well with 
the observation that the unit value of exported varieties increases in the income, 




benchmark case, the model with quality predicts that trade liberalization decreases the 
average price of a country’s exports. This prediction is akin to the “shipping the good 
apples out” paradigm described by Alchian and Allen (1964) and is consistent with 




Chapter 3: Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the role of vertical product 
differentiation in explaining the price and export status patterns observed in micro 
data for a representative set of US manufacturing plants.25 The chapter begins by 
developing a tractable model of endogenous quality that explicitly demonstrates how 
heterogeneity in a single exogenous parameter, productivity, can produce dispersion 
in quality, price, and export status. The framework is a generalization of the previous 
chapter’s model in which producers can choose from a continuous range of 
technologies. Removing the high/low dichotomy results in a one-to-one mapping of 
productivity into quality and makes the model better suited for the empirical 
investigation. 
The main difficulty in exploring the impact of vertical product differentiation is 
that quality is not directly observable in general. Recent papers in the trade literature 
use the average unit value, an estimate of price, to make inferences about the role of 
product quality in determining export patterns.26 However, there are many reasons to 
believe this strategy potentially leads to biased rsults. First, many factors besides 
                                                
25 The research in this chapter was conducted while te author was Special Sworn Status researcher of 
the U.S. Census Bureau at the Center for Economic Study Census Research Data Center in 
Washington. Any opinions and conclusions expressed h rein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure 
that no confidential information is disclosed. 
26 As mentioned earlier, the recent studies of Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen 
(2008) show that the correlation between average unit value and export status is positive, while 




variation in quality can lead to price dispersion. For instance, Syverson (2004) shows 
that variation in regional demand and competition are important sources of price 
heterogeneity. Second, price dispersion does not necessarily capture the full extent of 
quality variation. The theory presented in this chapter clearly demonstrates how, in 
the presence of vertical product differentiation, the firm’s productivity affects output 
price through two distinct channels. On the one hand, productivity leads to a decrease 
in marginal cost, which lowers the equilibrium price. On the other hand, productivity 
increases the optimal quality, which raises marginal production cost and the 
equilibrium price. The overall impact of productiviy on price and, as a result, the 
relationship between price and quality depend on the underlying parameters of the 
model. In those industries where price and quality are only weakly positively related, 
an increase in product quality will not be reflected in price but rather in the quantity 
demanded. It thus seems important to move away from unit value and to take into 
account the separate roles of productivity and other factors affecting price dispersion 
when studying product quality. 
In the theoretical model, quality is defined as variation in demand unexplained by 
variation in price and due to producer behavior. These demand “residuals” are 
estimated for U.S. manufacturing plants producing i 125 five-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) industries over the p riod 1972-1997.27 The estimated 
demand residuals are positively correlated with advertising, new technology 
expenditure and unit production cost at the plant level. These results suggest that 
demand residuals are not random but instead arise from deliberate activities on the 
                                                
27 These industries are listed in Table III. This is not the first paper to look at the impact of demand 
shocks in studying plant behavior. See Melitz (2000), Eslava et al. (2004), Foster, Haltiwanger and 




part of the plant aimed at increasing the consumer’s valuation of its output.28 Using 
the demand residuals as a measure of quality, the analysis produces the following 
producer-level results: (i) Quality is positively correlated with unit cost and price on 
average; (ii) Productivity is negatively correlated with unit cost and price on average; 
(iii) Productivity and quality are positively correlated on average; (iv) Quality, in 
addition to productivity, is an important determinant of the plant’s export status. All 
of these findings are consistent with the quality-extended model and imply that 
vertical product differentiation plays an important role in explaining plant-level price 
and export status patterns. 
The demand residuals that serve as proxy for quality re likely to contain more 
than just information about product quality. Therefo , while the empirical findings 
are compelling evidence of a link between producer behavior and consumer demand 
it is not clear that the estimated correlations are du  exclusively to vertical product 
differentiation. This implies that the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients may be 
biased and overstate the actual importance of quality. The last part of the analysis 
tackles the issue by using the simulated method of moments (SMM) to estimate the 
model’s structural parameters in order to evaluate th  ability of the model to 
reproduce observed facts and assess the importance of quality differentiation. The 
numerical results show that marginal production costs are concave in quality while 
fixed production costs are convex in quality. Since th  parameters underlying these 
findings are left unrestricted in the estimation these results support the idea that plants 
                                                
28 In a contemporaneous study Foster et. al. (2008b) exploit time series variation in demand residuals 
(defined differently) to show that they are related o the age and accumulated sales of the plants. The 
two works are complementary. Foster et. al. (2008b) study the dynamic evolution of demand and 
explain time series variation. The current analysis concentrates on the determinants of time invariant 




use quality as a means to compete in the market. Fur her, the results suggest that 
using demand residuals as of proxy for quality is a re sonable empirical strategy. 
Evaluated at the optimal parameter values the correlation between the theoretically 
accurate measure of quality and the constructed proxy estimated from the simulated 
data is above 0.9. 
Another advantage of structural estimation is that it allows for counterfactual 
experiments. Once the estimates for the parameters ar  known the model can be used 
to evaluate the effect of exogenous shocks. The current analysis concentrates on three 
different types of trade liberalization: (i) A ten percent decrease in variable trade 
costs; (ii) A ten percent decrease in fixed trade costs; (iii) A ten percent decrease in 
both variable and fixed trade costs. The results show that trade is an important 
determinant of productivity in the industry. 
Overall this chapter provides substantial empirical evidence that the ability to 
produce varieties of high quality confers an important competitive advantage to the 
firm and influences many aspects of its behavior. The rest of the chapter is structured 
as follows. The next section introduces quality differentiation among heterogeneous 
firms and analyzes the unique open economy equilibri m. Section 3 describes the 
dataset and explains the sample construction. Section 4 develops the econometric 
methodology and explores the relationship between productivity, quality, price, cost 
and export status. Section 5 presents the structural estimation and computational 
analysis of the model. Conclusions are presented in section 6. Derivation of major 








Consider an economy composed of a measure L of infinitely lived consumers each 
endowed with one unit of labor per period. Consumers have no taste for leisure and 
inelastically supply their labor to the market at the prevailing wage rate, which is 
normalized to one without loss of generality. 
3.2.1 Preferences 
As in the previous chapter, preferences over the differentiated commodities are 
additively separable with weights defined by the quality of the commodity. Letting 
)x(q  and )x( ω represent the consumption level and quality of variety x, preferences 














− .  (1) 
The optimal consumption of each commodity is chosen to minimize the cost of 





























= ∫ ,  (2) 
where )x(p  represents the price of variety x, 1ρ)1/(1ε >−=  is the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties, and the aggregator P is the quality-adjusted ideal price 





Production entails both fixed and marginal costs. By assumption quality is costly to 
produce, so that production costs are increasing in product quality. The total cost 
function depends on the firm’s productivity (φ) and the quality of its output (ω) and is 














+ω=ϕ      where γc ωf)(F +=ω , with cf , η , 0γ > , (3)
and w is the common wage rate hereafter normalized to one. The fixed cost, )(F ω , is 
increasing in quality and bounded below by cf , which represents the fixed cost 
incurred by a firm producing a variety of “zero” quality.29 Conditional on 
productivity, the marginal cost (ηω ) is increasing in the quality of output. Intuitively 
this assumes that the production of higher quality units requires more resources 
(labor).30 The total cost function implies that, holding quality fixed, all producers 
share the same labor overhead cost, but that the variable cost is decreasing in 
productivity. This captures the idea that, conditional on quality, the maintenance cost 
of each technology is the same for all firms but that, as a result of efficient 
management, firms operated by high ability entrepreneurs will be able to better 
exploit their resources to achieve lower marginal costs then firms managed by 
entrepreneurs of lesser ability. Implicitly the model assumes that firms are different in 
their productive efficiency but not in their ability to produce higher quality varieties. 
                                                
29 It is never optimal for a firm to produce a variety of quality zero in equilibrium. This formulation 
includes the Melitz (2003) production function as a pecial case, in which ω equals one for all firms 
and 1 + fc  equals f.  
30 In practice, the increase in production costs could also be due to the use of a different, more costly 




3.2.3 International Trade 
The world is composed of two identical countries.31 In order to sell their products in 
foreign markets, plants must build and maintain relations with foreign distributors, as 
discussed in Roberts and Tybout (1997). In addition, plants face tariffs and pay 
freight costs to send their products to foreign markets. These trade impediments take 
the form of a fixed export cost (xf ) that must be paid every period by exporting 
plants, and a constant melting-iceberg cost per-unit shipped to foreign countries (τ). 
Precisely, if 1>τ  units are shipped to the foreign country, only one unit arrives. 
These costs are assumed to be constant with respect to quality to prevent arbitrary 
differences in trade costs from driving the results. 
3.2.4 Profit Maximization 
Producers are single-plant, single-product profit maxi izers. Entry is assumed to be 
costly as production start up costs must be incurred. The entry cost is the same for all 
potential entrants and is denoted ef . The value of the investment opportunity is 
learned only once the fixed entry cost is sunk and the entrepreneur learns its 
productivity (φ), which is assumed to be a random draw from the distribution )(G ϕ  
on support ),1[ ∞⊆Φ . After learning its productivity, the entrepreneur can decide to 
exit the industry immediately or build a plant and produce a variety. If the 
entrepreneur stays in the industry he makes three inter-related choices 
simultaneously. He chooses the quality and unit price of the plant’s output and 
                                                
31 When countries are identical, they share the same ggregate variables, which greatly simplify the 
analysis. Extending the model to include N countries is straightforward but keeping an eye on the 





whether or not to enter the foreign market, in order to maximize the plant’s profit 
function: 
)fq~p~(I),(pq),( xx −+ϕωΓ−=ϕωπ  (4)
where ),( ϕωΓ  is defined in (3), Ix is an indicator variable equal to 1 if some output is 
exported and 0 otherwise, and p~  and q~  represent the price and demand of a domestic 
variety sold in the foreign market.  
An interesting feature of this problem is that the optimal choice of quality 
depends not only on the productivity of the firm but also on its exporting status. This 
implies that the mapping from productivity to quality is discontinuous at the marginal 
exporter’s productivity level. The solution is obtained in three steps: (i) Solve for the 
optimal price conditional on quality; (ii) Solve for the optimal quality conditional on 
export status; (iii) Solve for the threshold productivity level above which firms decide 
to enter the foreign market. Together these three results provide the equilibrium 
mapping between productivity, quality, price, quantity, revenue and export status. 
Profit maximization implies that firms will set marginal cost equal to marginal 





),p( ,     and      ),(p ),(p~ ϕωτ=ϕω  (5) 
where ),(p ϕω  and ),(p~ ϕω  respectively denote the domestic and foreign price of a 
domestically produced variety conditional on the firm’s productivity and quality. 
These equations highlight the importance of the intraction between quality and 
productivity in determining the output price. While the price is increasing in the 




the price function in the quality space is governed by the quality elasticity of marginal 
production costs (η). This is due to the markup nature of the pricing rule: any change 
in production cost results in a proportional change in price. 
 Substituting (3) and (5) into (4) and using the fact that, from (2) and (5), 
pq τq~p~ ε1−= , conditional profits for non-exporters (dπ ) and exporters (xπ ) can 
respectively be expressed as: 
cd f),(),( −ϕωΛ=ϕωπ      where 




βγε− ,     where 1]1)1([ −−−εη+γ≡β . 
(6)
Taking the first order conditions with respect to quality (ω) yields the following 
optimal quality choice as a function of export status: 
)1(
d A)(
−εβϕ=ϕω ,  
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−εη−≡ 1)P(R)1(1A . (7)
Quality is positive if the constant A, common to all producers in the market, is 
positive.32 This requires that: 
 
Assumption 1: )1(1 −εη> . 
 
This condition is assumed to hold for the rest of the chapter. It requires that the 
quality elasticity of cost (η) and the price elasticity of demand (ε) are small. If this is 
not the case the increase in revenue from upgrading quality is less than the increase in 
cost and, as a result, upgrading quality is never optimal. This happens because 
consumers are very sensitive to price increases and put relatively more weight on 
                                                
32 The aggregate expenditure (R) is exogenous and equal to the size of the population (L), because the 
wage rate is normalized to one. Therefore, the constant A depends on only one endogenous variable, 




price (or quantity) rather than quality – recall that ε becomes large as ρ goes to 1, 
which from the preferences defined in (1) implies that quality has no importance. 
Further, whenever the iceberg transport cost is not trivial, equation (7) implies that 
there is a discontinuity in the function mapping productivity to optimal quality at the 
export margin and that exporters produce higher quality varieties. This happens 
because access to a larger market increases the return to quality upgrading. This point 
will be discussed further below. 
 Finally, define dx π−π≡∆  as the difference between exporter and non-exporter 
profits. By definition, a profit maximizing firm will enter the foreign market if and 









where β and A are defined in (6) and (7) respectively. Hence, again from (6), the 





















The threshold productivity above which firms enter the export market is defined as 

























−εη−=ϕ .  (10)
Note that this threshold implicitly depends on the distribution of productivity in the 





Since profits are increasing in productivity and firms stay in the industry only if their 
profits are non-negative, free entry determines a profitability threshold ( oϕ ) below 
which non-exporters will decide to exit the industry. The zero-profit condition that 










where the last expression follows from (6) and (8). Finally, combining (10) and (11) it 
follows that the productivity profitability threshold for export ( xϕ ) is function of the 
profitability threshold for non-exporters and can be expressed as: 



















If 1<κ  the export threshold is lower than the non-exporters profitability threshold 
and all producers export. To make the model interesing κ is assumed to be greater 







Intuitively, the export costs (xf  and τ) have to be large relative to the lower bound on 
fixed cost ( cf ). Under this assumption, plants drawing productivity below the 
profitability threshold, defined in (11), will exit he industry. Those drawing 




productivity is above the export profitability threshold, defined in (12), the plant will 
export. 
 Each period, incumbents face a probability )1,0(∈δ  of being hit by an exogenous 
shock that will force them to exit the industry. Henc , the value of entry is zero if the 
entrant draws a productivity below the profitability threshold and exits, and equal to 
the stream of future profits discounted by the probability of exit if it draws an ability 
above the cutoff value and produces. Since profit is the same in every period, the 








t ,     where })(π,)(π,0max{)π( xd ϕϕ=ϕ   
and t is the time index. The ex-post probability density function for productivity, 
)µ(ϕ  is conditional on successful entry and is truncated at the profitability threshold 
( oϕ ). To obtain tractable closed form solutions and to make progress towards an 
empirical and computational model, more structure ne ds to be put on the distribution 
of productivity. Following the literature, productivi y is assumed to be Pareto 
distributed.33 The ex-ante cumulative distribution function of productivity is thus 
given by σ−ϕ−=ϕ 1)G(  where σ is a parameter that affects the shape of the 
distribution. Some restrictions on this parameter ar  required. 
 
Assumption 3: )}1(,2max{σ −εβγ> . 
 
                                                
33 As explained earlier, in addition to being tractable, the Pareto distribution provides a reasonable 




By definition of the Pareto distribution, 2σ >  is required to ensure a finite variance. 
The assumption that )1(σ −εβγ>  is required to ensure a well defined equilibrium; 
see the appendix for details. Under these conditions, the conditional ex-post 
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while the ex-ante probability of successful entry in the industry is given by 
σ−ϕ=ϕ− oo)(G1 .  
There exists an unbounded set of potential entrants in he industry. Plants will 
attempt entry in the industry as long as the expected value from entry is greater then 
the sunk entry cost ef . The characteristics of the ex-ante distribution of pr ductivity 
)(G ϕ  are assumed to be common knowledge such that the expect d value of entry is 
identical for all potential entrants and given by the product of the average 
incumbent’s value and the ex-ante probability of successful entry. Therefore, the free 















d)µ()π()(π o  (13)
is the average profit in the industry conditional on the profitability threshold. 
Equation (13) clearly shows that the free entry condition depends on only one 
endogenous parameter, the profitability threshold (oϕ ). This condition alone is 
sufficient to pin down the unique equilibrium value of the threshold (∗ϕo ) as a 

































The profitability threshold is always positive since from assumption 3, σ)1( <−εβγ . 
However the assumptions on the parameters are not sufficient to guarantee that ∗ϕo  is 
greater than one – the lower bound on productivity. It is therefore possible to have an 
equilibrium in which every entrant stays in the industry regardless of their 
productivity. 
 Since countries are identical, trade is balanced and revenue is the same in each 
country. The equilibrium mass of producers in the industry (M) can be obtained by 
dividing aggregate expenditure ( LR = ) by the average firm-level revenue (r ) – see 
the appendix. The equilibrium threshold and mass of incumbents can be used to 
obtain an expression for the equilibrium price index defined in (2); again see the 
appendix. By definition, in a stationary equilibrium, every aggregate variable must 
remain constant over time. This requires a mass of new entrants ( eM ) in each period, 
such that the mass of successful entrants (eeMζ ) exactly replaces the mass of 
incumbents ( Mδ ) hit by the exogenous shock and forced to exit. This aggregate 
stability condition requires MM ee δ=ζ . Finally, it can be shown that: 
 
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium. 





This completes the characterization of the unique costly trade open economy 
equilibrium. 
3.2.6 Analysis of Equilibrium 
This section explores the theoretical implications of quality differentiation. The 
analysis focuses on predictions that are testable given the available data. The main 
results are summarized in three propositions that will be examined empirically. 
From (7), productivity and quality are positively related in equilibrium as long as 
0]1)1([ 1 >−−εη+γ≡β − , which requires that 1/)1( −ε<ηγ− . Intuitively this 
condition holds if the marginal production cost increases fast enough in quality 
relative to the fixed cost. In this case, the function mapping productivity into profits 
associated with a high quality variety will intersect the lower quality profit functions 
from below and the model leads to endogenous quality sorting of producers by 
productivity, such that in equilibrium quality and productivity are positively 
correlated.  
 
Proposition 2. If the marginal production cost increases fast enough in quality 
relative to the fixed cost 0)(β > , product quality and plant productivity are 
positively correlated. 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is a discontinuity at the margin between exporter and non-
exporters in the function mapping productivity to optimal quality as defined in (7). 
The percentage difference in quality between exporters and non-exporters conditional 




depends on the demand and technology parameters as well as the iceberg trade cost. 
A decrease in trade costs increases the share of thforeign market domestic firms will 
be able to capture, thereby increasing the gains from quality upgrading for exporters. 
The model predicts that productivity has two opposite effects on the equilibrium 
price. From (7), the optimal choice of quality is increasing in productivity. From the 
pricing rule (5), price is increasing in quality but decreasing in productivity. 
Therefore to obtain the relationship between price and productivity, the effect of 
productivity on quality must be taken into account. Replacing with (7) in (5) provides 







ϕ=ϕ      and     )p()τ(1)(p βηε1x ϕ+=ϕ
− . 
where )(px ϕ  is the home price of a domestically produced variety manufactured by 
an exporter. These equations have two important implications. First, price and 
productivity are negatively correlated only if 1)1( <η−εβ  which, if quality and 
productivity are positively related ( 0>β ) is equivalent to 1>γ . Therefore price is 
negatively correlated with productivity only if the fixed production cost is convex in 
quality.34 Second, in the presence of transport costs, exporters will charge higher 
prices. The size of the discontinuity in price at the exporting margin is given by 
βηε−τ+ )1( 1 , which is decreasing in τ. As mentioned earlier, a decrease in trade costs 
increases the gains from quality upgrading, which leads to higher prices. 
                                                
34 This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Recall that at the export margin there is a jump in 
quality and, as a result, in price. This could lead to a positive correlation despite the convexity of the 
fixed cost. However, if the convexity is strong enough the correlation between price and productivity 




Proposition 3. Holding quality fixed, price is decreasing in productivity, while 
holding productivity fixed, price is increasing in quality. Further, price and 
productivity are negatively correlated only if the fixed production cost is 
convex in quality. 
 
 From (12), the model predicts that only the most productive firms will engage in 
international trade. Therefore, since productivity and quality are positively related, 
exporting firms will produce relatively high quality varieties. Further, from (2) and 
(5), exporters will be larger in terms of revenue and output. Finally, firms engage in 
international trade only if the xtra profit from entering the foreign market (x
~π ) is 






~ −ϕϕ=ϕπ −−−− ,  (15) 
where )(x ϕω  is defined in (7). This implies that the effect of productivity on the 
probability of export can be decomposed into two comp nents: a direct or price effect 
( 1ε−ϕ ) and an indirect or quality effect ( 1)η(ε1ω −− ). These results are summarized in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. Exporting firms are more productive, larger (in terms of 
revenue and output) and produce higher quality varieties than firms that sell 
their output in the domestic market only. 
 





The data set is derived from the Census of Manufactres (CM) – a component of the 
US Census Bureau’s Economic Census. The CM is conducte  every five years and 
the analysis uses information from 1972 to 1997. The unit of observation for the 
analysis is a plant/product/year combination. The CM covers all manufacturing plants 
with one or more paid employees. However very small plants – known as 
administrative records – are exempt from filling out Census forms. In those cases, the 
plant’s information is imputed. These establishments represent a very small share of 
overall U.S. manufacturing output and are removed from the sample. The CM 
contains plant level data on payroll, employment, book values of equipment and 
structures, the cost of materials and energy, and export value and plant-by-product 
level data on the value of shipments. In addition, f r a subset of products, the CM 
collects information on shipments in physical units. Since the empirical analysis 
requires data on price and quantity, the sample is lim ted to those products for which 
such information is available.35 
For the empirical analysis, products are defined as five-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) product classes.36 The 1987 SIC code segments manufacturing 
output into 459 four-digit industry and 1446 five-digit product classes according to its 
end use.37 Table I provides a sense of the relative level of detail between five-digit 
product classes, four-digit industries and two-digit major sector. The table lists the 
                                                
35 The subset varies over time. For instance, much of t e apparel major group (SIC 23) was dropped in 
1982. Plant-by-product balancing codes, receipt for contract work, resale, and miscellaneous receipts 
are removed since these observations are unrelated to production. 
36 Plants are required to report quantity produced at the seven-digit SIC level. For those plants in the 
sample that  produce more than one seven-digit product within their primary five-digit product class 
the quantities are aggregated. 
37 Additional details can be obtained from the Numerical List of Manufactured and Mineral Products 




products contained in SIC industry 2051, “Bread, Cake nd Related Products”, which 
is one of the industries in SIC major sector 20, “Food and Kindred Products”. The 
industry contains six products which, although related in end use, differ in terms of 
material inputs and production technologies. Therefore, using the much finer five-
digit classification removes a lot of undesired horiz ntal differentiation from the 
analysis. 
Table I: Product Categories in SIC 2051 
SIC Description 
20 Food and Kindred Products 
2051 Bread, Cake and Related Products 
20511 Bread: White, Wheat and Rye 
20512 Rolls, Bread-Type 
20513 Sweet Yeast Goods 
20514 Soft Cakes 
20515 Pies 
20518 Pastries 
Source: Numerical List of Manufactured 
and Mineral Products, U.S. Census Bureau 
(1996). 
 
Minor revisions to SIC categories are made in each census year and major 
revisions were made in 1977 and 1987. These changes make it difficult to keep track 
of products over time while ensuring that the product’s definition remains the same. 
Therefore, to ensure uniformity of products the analysis is limited to codes that 
appear in every year. 
The average unit value of output, a proxy for price, s defined as the ratio of the 




reporting errors, observations with an output price above 5 times or lower than one 
fifth of the product’s median price are removed from the sample.  
In the CM factor inputs are reported not separately by product but rather at the 
plant level. To reduce measurement problems in computing productivity measures 
and to increase the accuracy of the production cost measures the sample includes only 
the primary product of specialized plants. A multi-product plant is considered to be 
specialized if the primary product accounts for at le st 50 percent of the total nominal 
value of plant shipments.  
Further, to ensure that there is enough variation to es imate plant fixed effects, the 
sample is limited to product classes for which there a e at least 25 specialized 
observations that satisfy all the above criteria in each year.38 Finally, a few product 
classes with heterogeneous units of measurement for quantity are removed from the 
sample. 
Together, these rules lead to a sample of 107,115 observations distributed across 
125 five-digit SIC product classes. The sample contains about 4.5 percent of the  total 
plant/year observations in the CM and about 6 percent of the five-digit SIC codes are 
represented in the sample. Table II provides basic statistics for the sample at the two-
digit SIC major sector level. Although most sectors a e represented in the sample, 
some are more important than others. In particular the “food and kindred product” 
sector (SIC 20) accounts for 25 percent of observations and about half of the revenue 
and export value in the sample. The “lumber and wood products” (SIC 24) and the 
“stone, clay, and glass products” (SIC 32) sectors also account for relatively large 
                                                
38 Using a minimum of 50 plants leads to almost identical results. 
Table II: Sample Characteristics 
Total Number of   Sample Share of   St. Dev. of   Revenue Share (%) of 
SIC2 Name 
Products Plant/Year   Plants Revenue Export   Log Price   Advertising Software 
20 Food and Kindred Products 46 27,155   0.25 0.43 0.53   0.41   0.437 0.038 
22 Textile Mill Products 13 5,424   0.05 0.05 0.04   0.52   0.076 0.054 
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 3 1,155   0.01 0.00 0.00   0.56   0.548 0.104 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 20 21,128   0.20 0.10 0.15   0.41   0.141 0.032 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 7 6,482   0.06 0.03 0.02   0.51   1.280 0.090 
26 Paper and Allied Products 6 9,549   0.09 0.07 0.02   0.36   0.023 0.043 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 4 2,374   0.02 0.01 0.01   0.60   0.071 0.054 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 2 1,458   0.01 0.15 0.08   0.43   0.135 0.040 
31 Leather and Leather Products 6 3,419   0.03 0.02 0.01   0.58   0.706 0.364 
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 5 18,755   0.18 0.05 0.01   0.25   0.060 0.029 
33 Primary Metal Industries 8 7,724   0.07 0.07 0.11   0.47   0.058 0.070 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1 716   0.01 0.01 0.01   0.50   0.032 0.079 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 2 748   0.01 0.01 0.01   0.69   0.366 0.223 
37 Transportation Equipment 1 604   0.01 0.00 0.00   0.70   0.836 0.027 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1 424   0.00 0.00 0.00   0.43   0.066 0.022 
Sample 125 107,115        0.42  0.322 0.085 
Notes: This table shows the number of product and plants/year observations by SIC2 sectors, as well as each se tor’s share of total real 
revenue and export in the sample (pooled across all ye rs). The table also shows the standard deviation of log price and the average revenue 
share of advertising and new software expenditure at the plant-level in each sector. Product-year fixed effects are removed from price before 




fractions of observations. As can be seen from Table III, which presents the complete 
list of five-digit SIC products included in the analysis, this uneven representation 
across sectors is mostly due to the distribution of sample products across two-digit 
SIC sectors rather than the distribution of plants across five-digit SIC product 
classes.39 This characteristic of the sample reflects the Census Bureau’s decision to 
collect product level physical quantity information in some sectors and not in others. 
To get a sense of how representative of the CM universe this sample is, the share of 
revenue, export and number of plant across two-digit major are calculated and 
compared to those in the sample. On the one hand, the Food and Kindred Products 
(SIC 20), the Lumber and Wood Products (SIC 24) and the Stone, Clay, and Glass 
Products (SIC 32) each account for much larger fraction of plant/year observations, 
revenue and export revenue in the sample than in the CM.  On the other hand Printing 
and Publishing (SIC 27), Fabricated Metal Products (SIC 34) and Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment (SIC 35) are all underrepresented in the sample. Therefore 
it is not clear that the conclusions of this study can be applied to the whole 
manufacturing sector. 
An important message of Table II is the substantial variation in price within each 
product class. On average, after removing product/year fixed effects, the standard 
deviation of mean log price is about 0.42. Moreover, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in this measure of dispersion across two-digit SIC major sectors. The 
dispersion estimates range from 0.06 for the “stone, clay, and glass products” sector 
(SIC 32) to 0.49 in the “transportation equipment” sector (SIC 37). In general the
                                                
39 One notable exception is the “ready-mixed concrete” product class (SIC 32730) which comprises 




Table III: Product Characteristics 
SIC5 Name Plant/year Share Elasticity 
20111 Beef, Not Canned or Made Into Sausage (NCOMIS) 1,458 1.4 -4.33 (0.34)*** 
20114 Pork, NCOMIS 360 0.3 -2.01 (0.26)*** 
20117 Sausages and Similar Products, Not Canned (NC) 250 0.2 -3.04 (0.52)*** 
20136 Pork, Processed or Cured, Including Frozen (NCOMIS) 508 0.5 -2.91 (0.32)*** 
20137 Sausage and Similar Products (NC) 1,366 1.3 -2.54 (0.17)*** 
20151 Young Chickens (Usually Under 20 Weeks Of Age) Whole or Parts 1,011 0.9 -3.01 (0.29)*** 
20153 Turkeys (Including Frozen, Whole or Parts) 256 0.2 -3.83 (0.94)*** 
20159 Liquid, Dried, and Frozen Eggs 213 0.2 -2.74 (0.42)*** 
20223 Natural Cheese, Except Cottage Cheese 1,877 1.8 -4.95 (0.38)*** 
20235 Dry Milk Products and Mixtures 346 0.3 -3.52 (0.71)*** 
20240 Ice Cream and Ices 1,221 1.1 -2.36 (0.15)*** 
20331 Canned Fruits, Except Baby Foods 384 0.4 -3.03 (0.42)*** 
20332 Canned Vegetables, Except Hominy and Mushrooms 979 0.9 -3.44 (0.33)*** 
2033A Canned Fruit Juices, Nectars, and Concentrates 250 0.2 -3.16 (0.63)*** 
20343 Dried and Dehydrated Fruits and Vegetables (Including Freeze-Dried) 382 0.4 -2.58 (0.29)*** 
20352 Pickles and Other Pickled Products 416 0.4 -1.50 (0.12)*** 
20354 Mayonnaise, Salad Dressings, and Sandwich Spreads 319 0.3 -1.96 (0.19)*** 
20372 Frozen Vegetables 640 0.6 -3.01 (0.29)*** 
20382 Frozen Dinners 608 0.6 -2.12 (0.17)*** 
20384 Frozen Specialties 310 0.3 -1.29 (0.18)*** 
20411 Wheat Flour, Except Flour Mixes 900 0.8 -3.06 (0.28)*** 
20440 Milled Rice and Byproducts 217 0.2 -2.03 (0.29)*** 
20473 Dog Food 524 0.5 -2.38 (0.22)*** 
20481 Chicken and Turkey Feed, Supplements, Concentrates, nd Premixes 1,032 1.0 -3.75 (0.34)*** 
20482 Dairy Cattle Feed, Complete 574 0.5 -5.20 (1.27)*** 
20485 Swine Feed Supplements, Concentrates, and Premixes 318 0.3 -2.77 (0.51)*** 
20487 Beef Cattle Feed Supplements, Concentrates, and Premixes 274 0.3 -4.63 (1.13)*** 
20511 Bread: White, Wheat, and Rye (Including Frozen) 2,112 2.0 -2.01 (0.11)*** 
20514 Soft Cakes 336 0.3 -1.45 (0.19)*** 
20521 Crackers, Pretzels, Biscuits, and Related Products 394 0.4 -2.81 (0.33)*** 
20610 Sugarcane Mill Products and Byproducts 245 0.2 -1.64 (0.15)*** 
20630 Refined Beet Sugar and Byproducts 265 0.3 -2.07 (0.17)*** 
20680 Nuts and Seeds (Salted, Roasted, Cooked, or Blanched) 394 0.4 -1.91 (0.22)*** 
20771 Grease and Inedible Tallow 550 0.5 -2.52 (0.30)*** 
20772 Feed and Fertilizer Byproducts 430 0.4 -1.83 (0.20)*** 
20791 Shortening and Cooking Oils 314 0.3 -1.73 (0.23)*** 
20821 Canned Beer and Ale Case Goods 213 0.2 -10.1 (4.87)** 
20840 Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits 816 0.8 -1.41 (0.07)*** 
20853 Bottled Liquor, Except Brandy 293 0.3 -1.50 (0.18)*** 
20923 Frozen Fish 386 0.4 -3.19 (0.54)*** 
20925 Frozen Shellfish 393 0.4 -3.27 (0.53)*** 
20951 Roasted Coffee 539 0.5 -3.52 (0.38)*** 






Table III: Product Characteristics (continued) 
SIC5 Name Plant/year Share Elasticity 
20970 Manufactured Ice 1,045 1.0 -1.96 (0.10)*** 
20980 Macaroni, Spaghetti, and Egg Noodle Products 420 0.4 -2.21 (0.27)*** 
20996 Vinegar and Cider 185 0.2 -1.98 (0.25)*** 
2221J Finished Manmade Fiber and Silk Broad woven Fabrics 197 0.2 -1.35 (0.15)*** 
22516 Women’s and Misses’ Finished Panty Hose, Including Tights 394 0.4 -1.77 (0.22)*** 
22522 Men’s Finished Seamless Hosiery (Sizes 10 and Up) 591 0.6 -1.73 (0.15)*** 
22573 Finished Weft (Circular) Knit Fabrics, Except Hosiery 552 0.5 -1.79 (0.18)*** 
22581 Warp Knit Fabrics Greige Goods 249 0.2 -1.97 (0.30)*** 
22617 Finished Cotton Broad woven Fabrics (Not Finished in Weaving Mills) 276 0.3 -1.16 (0.14)*** 
22629 Finishing of Manmade Fiber and Silk Broad Woven Fabrics 533 0.5 -1.43 (0.10)*** 
22690 Finished Yarn, Raw Stock, and Narrow Fabrics 345 0.3 -1.55 (0.14)*** 
22811 Carded Cotton Yarns 515 0.5 -2.34 (0.31)*** 
22814 Spun Noncellulosic Fiber and Silk Yarns 903 0.8 -3.13 (0.26)*** 
22825 Textured, Crimped, or Bulked Filament Yarns, Including Stretch Yarn 323 0.3 -1.59 (0.19)*** 
22971 Non Woven Fabrics 266 0.3 -1.47 (0.12)*** 
22982 Soft Fiber Cordage and Twine (Except Cotton) 280 0.3 -1.34 (0.13)*** 
23230 Men’s and Boys’ Neckwear 345 0.3 -1.82 (0.20)*** 
23532 Cloth Hats and Caps 503 0.5 -1.84 (0.17)*** 
23871 Leather Belts 307 0.3 -1.35 (0.10)*** 
24111 Softwood Logs, Bolts, and Timber 2,215 2.1 -4.05 (0.53)*** 
24113 Pulpwood 840 0.8 -3.99 (1.14)*** 
24211 Hardwood Lumber, Rough and Dressed, Except Siding 3,808 3.6 -2.41 (0.14)*** 
24212 Softwood Lumber, Rough and Dressed, Except Siding 4,707 4.4 -3.75 (0.20)*** 
24217 Softwood Cut Stock 334 0.3 -2.12 (0.32)*** 
24261 Hardwood Flooring 265 0.3 -1.53 (0.20)*** 
24262 Hardwood Dimension Stock, Furniture Parts, and Vehicl  Stock 982 0.9 -1.35 (0.08)*** 
24266 Wood Furniture Frames For Household Furniture 629 0.6 -2.30 (0.19)*** 
24311 Wood Window Units 376 0.4 -1.60 (0.19)*** 
24314 Wood Doors, Interior And Exterior 679 0.6 -1.56 (0.10)*** 
24341 Wood Kitchen Cabinets and Cabinetwork, Stock Line 1,127 1.1 -2.08 (0.18)*** 
24351 Hardwood Plywood 387 0.4 -1.41 (0.11)*** 
24354 Hardwood Veneer, Not Reinforced or Backed 470 0.4 -1.39 (0.12)*** 
24364 Softwood Veneer, Not Reinforced or Backed 266 0.3 -1.61 (0.15)*** 
24365 Softwood Plywood, Rough, Including Touch Sanded 405 0.4 -7.55 (2.11)*** 
24390 Fabricated Structural Wood Products 704 0.7 -2.08 (.026)*** 
24511 Manufactured (Mobile) Homes (35 Feet or More In Length) 1,825 1.7 -5.02 (0.30)*** 
24522 Precut Packages for Stationary Buildings (Complete Units) 370 0.4 -1.85 (0.30)*** 
24524 Stationary Buildings Shipped in Three-Dimensional Assemblies 417 0.4 -2.22 (0.26)*** 
24931 Particleboard, Produced at this Location 322 0.3 -2.04 (0.27)*** 
25112 Wood Living Room, Library, Family Room, and Den Furniture 680 0.6 -1.58 (0.14)*** 
25113 Wood Dining Room And Kitchen Furniture, Except Kitchen Cabinets 608 0.6 -1.99 (0.15)*** 
25115 Wood Bedroom Furniture 864 0.8 -1.48 (0.09)*** 






Table III: Product Characteristics (continued) 
SIC5 Name Plant/year Share Elasticity 
25145 Metal Household Dining Room and Kitchen Furniture 212 0.2 -1.14 (0.13)*** 
25147 Other Metal Household Furniture 201 0.2 -1.75 (0.25)*** 
25151 Innerspring Mattresses, Excluding Crib-Size 1,181 1.1 -1.91 (0.15)*** 
26530 Corrugated And Solid Fiber Boxes, Including Pallets 5,796 5.4 -2.47 (0.07)*** 
26552 Fiber Cans, Tubes, and Similar Fiber Products 884 0.8 -1.33 (0.06)*** 
26570 Folding Paperboard Boxes, Packaging, and Packaging Components 1,549 1.5 -1.85 (0.10)*** 
26741 Grocers’ Bags and Sacks and Variety and Shopping Bags 721 0.7 -1.60 (0.11)*** 
26742 Shipping Sacks and Multiwall Bags, All Materials Except Textiles 384 0.4 -1.46 (0.12)*** 
26753 Pasted, Lined, Laminated, or Surface-Coated Paperboard 215 0.2 -4.46 (0.95)*** 
28430 Surfactants, Finishing Agents, and Assistants 203 0.2 -2.14 (0.48)*** 
28914 Synthetic Resin and Rubber Adhesives 1,055 1.0 -1.61 (0.09)*** 
28932 Lithographic and Offset Inks 819 0.8 -1.76 (0.10)*** 
28934 Flexographic Inks 297 0.3 -2.46 (0.35)*** 
29111 Gasoline, Including Finished Base Stocks and Blending Agents 528 0.5 -3.31 (0.35)*** 
29920 Lubricating Oils and Greases, Not Made in a Refinery 930 0.9 -1.62 (0.08)*** 
31430 Men’s Footwear, Except Athletic 743 0.7 -2.87 (0.26)*** 
31440 Women’s Footwear, Except Athletic 906 0.9 -3.27 (0.27)*** 
31490 Footwear, Except Rubber, Not Elsewhere Classified (NEC) 433 0.4 -1.62 (0.16)*** 
31610 Suitcases, Briefcases, Bags, and Musical Instrument Cases 561 0.5 -1.60 (0.12)*** 
31710 Women’s and Children’s Handbags and Purses 566 0.5 -1.44 (0.10)*** 
31720 Personal Leather Goods, NEC 210 0.2 -1.67 (0.29)*** 
32410 Cement, Hydraulic (Including Cost of Shipping Contai ers) 947 0.9 -3.60 (0.28)*** 
32710 Concrete Brick and Block 2,538 2.4 -2.21 (0.11)*** 
32730 Ready-Mixed Concrete 14,414 13.5 -12.5 (0.67)*** 
32740 Lime (Including Cost of Containers) 392 0.4 -2.61 (0.31)*** 
32751 Gypsum Building Materials 464 0.4 -3.40 (0.39)*** 
33219 Other Gray Iron Castings 2,145 2.0 -1.97 (0.07)*** 
33417 Aluminum Ingot (Produced by Secondary Smelters) 318 0.3 -1.50 (0.19)*** 
33532 Aluminum Sheet and Strip (Including Continuous Cast) 183 0.2 -1.82 (0.25)*** 
33541 Extruded Aluminum Rod, Bar, and Other Extruded Shapes 674 0.6 -1.71 (0.11)*** 
33630 Aluminum and Aluminum-Base Alloy Die-Castings 1,215 1.1 -1.93 (0.11)*** 
33640 Nonferrous Die-Castings (Except Aluminum) 1,115 1.0 -1.49 (0.08)*** 
33650 Aluminum and Aluminum-Base Alloy Castings 1,758 1.6 -1.84 (0.08)*** 
33991 Metal Powders, Paste, and Flakes 316 0.3 -1.18 (0.09)*** 
34625 Hot Impression Die Impact, Press, and Upset Steel Forgings 716 0.7 -2.03 (0.11)*** 
35373 Industrial Trucks and Tractors 272 0.3 -1.23 (0.17)*** 
35853 Commercial Refrigerators and Related Equipment 476 0.4 -1.41 (0.11)*** 
37322 Outboard Motorboats, Including Commercial and Military 604 0.6 -1.99 (0.19)*** 
39951 Metal Caskets and Coffins, Lined and Trimmed, Adult Sizes 424 0.4 -2.37 (0.27)*** 
Full Sample 107,115 100 -2.46 (0.02)*** 
Notes: This table shows the number and share of plants by product in the sample (pooled across all years). This table 
also shows the results of estimating demand curves by 2SLS separately for each product. All regressions include year 
fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by plant, re in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 




ranking of sectors in terms of price dispersion corresponds to prior beliefs. Primary 
resource sectors (stone, paper, food, lumber and petroleum) have lower price variance 
than finished goods sectors (apparel, leather products, chemicals, industrial 
machinery and transportation equipment). 
3.4 Empirics 
This section confronts the model with the data. In the theoretical model firm 
productivity affects outcome variables (such as price and export status) through two 
distinct channels: directly through cost and indirectly through quality. Much of the 
empirical analysis that follows tries to quantity the relative importance of these two 
components in an attempt to understand how producers use the margins of cost and 
quality to maximize their profits.  
The section starts by formulating an empirical strategy to obtain estimates for 
product quality at the plant level. It then explores the properties of these estimates – 
in particular the relationship of quality to advertising, new technology expenditure 
and production cost. The analysis then turns to the estimation of some important 
conditional covariances in order to quantify the relationships between productivity, 
price, quality, and export status. Overall the results suggest that both quality 
differentiation and cost are important channels through which firms exploit their 
productivity advantage, and that quality contributes significantly to observed 




3.4.1 Estimating Product Quality 
In theory the price and quality of a firm’s output are both determined by its 
productivity. However, from the point of view of the consumer, price and quality are 
two distinct product attributes. Equation (2) shows how the representative consumer 
combines these two signals to determine its optimal demand for a particular variety 
and suggests an empirical strategy to identify product quality. Adding a multiplicative 
error term to the demand function (2) and taking logs yields: 
jtjtjtjt eplnελqln +−ν+= , (16)
where j and t index plant and time respectively. The first term, 
ttt RlnPln)1( +−ε≡λ , is a time varying effect common to all plants producing 
varieties of the same product. The second term, ν , is a plant fixed effect, which 
captures the time invariant component of demand unexplained by price (p) and 
aggregate factors (λ). The plant fixed effect is equal to the log of the product’s quality 
(i.e. jj ln ω≡ν ). Finally, random shocks unexplained by the theory are represented by 
the error term e. Equation (16) implies that demand is log linear in quality and price 
and that demand is increasing in quality and decreasing in price. From (16), it follows 
that an estimate for product quality can be obtained by including producer fixed 
effects in a regression of quantity demanded on price and controlling for aggregate 
factors. 
If plants respond to positive random demand shocks (e) by raising their prices 
then estimating (16) using ordinary least squares leads to biased estimates of the price 
elasticity (ε ) and, as a result, of the plant’s average output quality (ν) – see 




procedure using the quantity total factor productivity (TFP) as an instrument for price 
is used to estimate (16) consistently. In essence, TFP is the variation in physical 
quantity produced unexplained by variation in inputs. It is constructed from the 
typical constant returns to scale index form: 
jtMjtEjtLjtKjtjt MlnElnLlnKlnqlnTFP ψ−ψ−ψ−ψ−= , 
where q, K, L, E and M represent establishment-level output quantities, capital 
stocks, labor hours, energy and materials inputs, and jψ  for }M,E,L,K{j∈  are the 
factor elasticities for the corresponding inputs.40 In the presence of price variation due 
to quality differentiation quantity TFP is a more accurate measure of physical 
productivity than revenue total factor productivity (RTFP), which uses nominal 
revenue deflated by a product-level price index as a measure of output. For instance, 
if price is increasing in quality, RTFP will overestimate the physical productivity of 
plants producing high quality varieties and underestimate the physical productivity of 
plants producing low quality varieties. Therefore regressing plants’ prices on RTFP in 
the first stage will produce biased estimates of the fitted prices used in the second 
stage. This potentially results in biased estimates of price elasticities and plant-level 
product quality. For the remainder of the analysis, productivity refers to quantity total 
factor productivity. 
Labor, materials, and energy cost shares are computed from reported expenditures 
in the CM. The real capital stock is the sum of plants’ reported book values for their 
                                                
40 The empirical work of Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Olley and Pakes (1996) on plant-level 
production function estimation supports the assumption of constant returns to scale. Note that the indx 
formulation is a departure from the theory: the model as a single factor of production and assumes that 
production costs are increasing in quality. If the terogeneity in quality is not controlled for the 
productivity estimates will be biased. Developing a productivity estimation procedure robust to 




structures and equipment, stocks deflated to 1987 levels using sector-specific 
deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Labor inputs are measured as 
plants’ reported production-worker hours multiplied by the ratio of total payroll to 
production workers’ payroll. The real cost of labor is obtained by multiplying the 
hours worked by the real wage. Real materials and energy inputs are plants’ reported 
expenditures on each deflated using the corresponding four-digit SIC input price 
indices from the NBER Productivity Database. For multi-product plants the inputs are 
scaled down using the primary product’s share of the plant’s nominal shipments. The 
input elasticities, jψ , are estimated using five-digit SIC average cost shares over the 
sample. The cost of capital is constructed by multiplying the real capital stock by the 
capital rental rate for the plant’s respective two-digit industry. These rental rates are 
from unpublished data constructed and used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 
computing their Multifactor Productivity series.41 
For the 2SLS procedure to produce reliable estimates for product quality four 
important identifying assumptions must hold. First, productivity should exhibit 
“moderate” persistence over time. On the one hand, it should be persistent enough to 
be uncorrelated with any short-run plant-specific demand shocks that affect prices (e). 
On the other hand, it should vary enough over time so that it is not perfectly collinear 
with the time invariant demand residual (ν). 42 Second, changes in TFP should not 
cause within-plant fluctuations in product quality. In terms of the model this would be 
true if the cost of adjusting quality is prohibitive, so that plants must make a once and 
for all choice of product quality based on the permanent (time-invariant) component 
                                                
41 See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008a) for additional details. 
42 In the full sample, regressing productivity and price on their own lag yields estimated coefficients 




of productivity. Third, fluctuations in TFP must cause within-plant variations in price 
and quantities. Together the last two assumptions requi e that time-varying 
productivity shocks affect price only through the direct cost channel and leave quality 
unchanged. In that case short-run fluctuations in price and productivity are negatively 
correlated. Fourth, fluctuations in measured TFP must reflect genuine productivity 
variations, rather than unmeasured cyclical variation in capital utilization driven by 
demand shocks.43 Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello (1996) and Basu, Fernald and 
Rebelo (2004) present empirical evidence that factor u ilization is procyclal and 
affects measured productivity in two-digit SIC manufacturing industries. If this is the 
case capital stock is not an accurate measure of capital utilization and will lead to 
biased estimates of productivity.44 
Equation (16) is estimated separately for each of te 125 five-digit products using 
a 2SLS procedure that instruments price with TFP. The estimated demand elasticities 
(ε) are reported in the last column of Table III. In all cases, the elasticity is negative 
and statistically significant. The instrument’s strength can be evaluated from first 
stage statistics. In all cases the first stage F statistic is large and the estimated 
coefficient for TFP is statistically significant. This suggests that the variation in TFP 
has some explanatory power over price. Finally, the IV and (unreported) OLS 
estimates differ substantially. About 75 percent of the IV estimates are larger in 
absolute value than the OLS estimates, suggesting a positive correlation between the 
exogenous random demand shocks (e) and prices (p). Further, the OLS results are not 
                                                
43 Since labor is measured in hours worked and not employ ent, it is less likely that unmeasured 
fluctuations in labor utilization could bias TFP estimates. 
44 The author suggests using energy usage to proxy for capital utilization. Using this measure of 





very well behaved: 6 estimated elasticities are positive and 72 are between zero and 
minus one. Overall these results support the use of the 2SLS estimation procedure. 
The standard deviation across plants of the estimated time invariant demand 
residuals (ν) is quite large (1.56). This suggests an important role for factors other 
than price in explaining the dispersion in output across plants manufacturing the same 
product. According to the theory these demand residuals contain information on 
product quality. To a certain extent this can be verified empirically by looking at the 
characteristics of the demand residuals. In a first exercise, for each of the 125 
products, the observations are split into two categori s according to the value of their 
demand residuals. Plants with residuals above the median are called high quality and 
the others low. Table IV presents differences in mean log price, cost, output, revenue 
and productivity between the high and low group, normalized by each variable’s 
standard deviation in the pooled sample. Formally, the statistic is defined as 
)z(stdev/)zz( LH −  where iz  is the mean of the log of variable Z in group i and 
LH zzz ∪≡ . 
Table IV: High vs. Low Demand Residuals Plants 
Price Cost Quantity Revenue TFP 
0.52 0.10 1.12 1.28 0.79 
 Notes: This table shows the normalized differences 
between the means of high and low demand residual 
plants for the full sample (107,115 observations). 
Unit production costs are measured as the sum of 
capital rental payments and depreciation, payroll, and
energy and material expenditures. All variables are in 
logs. Product-by-year fixed effects are removed 
before computing the statistics. 
 
The overall message of Table IV is clear: plants classified as high quality 




plants with high demand residuals charge higher prices, have higher unit production 
costs, are larger in terms of quantity and revenue, and are more productive. These 
results have at least two important implications. First, on average, plants with large 
estimated demand residuals face higher unit cost and charge relatively high prices 
despite being more productive. Second, these same plants enjoy relatively large 
market shares despite charging relatively high prices. These observations are 
consistent with the hypothesis that producers use qality differentiation in addition to 
price to compete in the industry. 
Profit-maximizing plants will incur greater costs in an attempt to increase quality 
only if such investments increase the consumer’s willingness to pay. Thus, the 
plausibility of the quality estimates can be evaluated by computing their correlation 
with different indicators of the plant’s investment i  quality. Advertising is generally 
an effective way to convey information to the consumer and to increase the perceived 
(or intangible) quality of the product, while new technology expenditure can be 
targeted at product development and can increase the (or tangible) quality by 
introducing new designs. The CM contains plant-level information on advertising 
expenditure and software and data processing services purchased from other 
companies for Census years 1992 and 1997, and information on new computer 
expenditure for Census year 1992 for all plants, and for years 1977, 1982 and 1987 on 
a subset of observations. The expenditures are divided by plant revenue to remove the 
impact of plant size.45 The average revenue share of advertising and software 
expenditures by two-digit SIC sector are reported in Table II. These shares are small 
                                                
45 This measure is similar in spirit to that used in Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) but is constructed 




(less than half a percent on average) but neverthelss exhibit significant variation 
across sectors. As can be seen from Table V, plants tha  invest a larger fraction of 
their revenue in advertising and software generally have larger demand residuals. The 
point estimates suggest a high return to advertising and new technology expenditures. 
A ten percent increase in the revenue share of advertising, software and computer 
expenditures are respectively associated with a 2.4 percent increase, a 3.6 percent 
increase, and 0.9 percent in the demand residual. 
 
Table V: Investment in Quality I 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
log Advertising 0.24     
  (0.006)***     
log Software   0.36   
    (0.007)***   
log Computer     0.09 
      (0.006)*** 
Sample Size 32,083 32,083 23,255 
R2 0.06 0.08 0.10 
SE of reg. 1.50 1.50 1.30 
Notes: This table reports the results from regressing a 
plant’s time invariant demand residual on advertising, 
software and computer expenditures, expressed as log hares 
of plant revenues. Standard errors clustered by plants re in 
parenthesis. All regressions include product-by-year fixed 
effects. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
While it is reassuring that the demand residuals are positively related to 
investment in new software, the interpretation of the relationship between these 
expenditures and quality is not as clear as for advertising. For instance, new software 




productivity could in turn motivate firms to produce higher quality varieties. To 
control for that possibility, measures of productivity are included in regressions of the 
revenue share of expenditure on new software and computer on the demand residuals. 
Before presenting the results it is important to point out that these estimating 
equations contain generated regressors. As a results, inference based on the usual 
OLS standard errors will be invalid since it ignores the sampling variation due to the 
estimation of these variables – see Wooldridge (2002). Therefore, for the remainder 
of the analysis, bootstrap standard errors are report d whenever an estimating 
equation includes one or more generated regressors.46 As it happens, the difference 
between the bootstrapped and the usual OLS estimated standard errors clustered by 
plant is negligible in the current analysis, and using clustered standard errors would 
not change the significance of any of the coefficients. 
The results from regressing new technology expenditures on the demand residuals 
controlling for plant productivity are reported in Table VI. The partial correlation 
between software expenditure and quality remains positive and significant. Overall 
these results suggest that producers devote resources to increase the demand for their 
product. 
Finally, unit cost patterns provide additional evidence that firms voluntarily invest 
in product quality. From the cost function, defined in (3), the marginal cost of 
production (c) depends on productivity and quality as follows:  
                                                
46 For a basic introduction to the bootstrap see Horowitz (2000). In the current context, the bootstrap is 
an appealing alternative to the use of asymptotic theory since it does not require a closed form solution 








Adding a multiplicative error term and taking logs yields the following estimating 
equation: 
jtjt2j10jt eˆlnˆcln +ϕξ+νξ+ξ= , (17)
where j and t index plant and time respectively. The second term, ν̂ , is the estimated 
demand residual, while ϕ̂  is the estimated plant productivity and e represents other 
unspecified factors affecting production costs. If the estimated demand residuals 
capture product quality, then according to the theory they should be positively 
correlated with the unit cost of production once productivity is controlled for – in 
other words 01 >η=ξ . The regression also includes a full set of product-by-year 
fixed effects ( 0ξ ) to control for product level and aggregate exogenus shocks 
uncorrelated with quality that could influence the production cost. 
 
Table VI: Investment in Quality II 
Dependent: log Software log Computer 
Variables (1) (2) 
Demand residuals 0.11 0.09 
  (0.004)*** (0.006)*** 
log TFP 0.16 0.11 
  (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
Sample Size 32,083 23,255 
R2 0.09 0.03 
SE of reg. 1.00 1.10 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All regressions include product-by-year 
fixed effects. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 





Total production costs include capital rental payment and depreciation, payroll, 
and energy and material expenditures. All of these cost components are likely to be 
measured with error in the data. Importantly, productivity is also constructed from the 
same badly measured input information, as a result there is correlated measurement 
error on both sides of the estimating equation. Since the sign of the bias depends on 
many unknowns, very little can be said, except that the bias goes to zero as 
measurement errors become small; see the appendix for a detailed discussion. For the 
analysis, variable unit costs are defined as material xpenditure over physical quantity 
produced. This choice reduces the correlation between measurement errors and is 
closely related to variable production costs.47 
The results from estimating (17) are presented in Table VII. The first two columns 
look at the separate effect of the demand residuals and TFP on production costs. In 
column (1) only the demand residual is included in the regression. The estimated 
effect of the demand residual on cost is positive and significant but small. As can be 
seen in column (2), productivity has a negative and significant impact on unit 
production costs. Column (3) presents the results of a specification including both 
productivity and the demand residual. As expected, the qualitative properties of the 
estimated coefficient are unchanged but the magnitudes are larger in absolute value. 
This happens because the productivity and quality effects work in opposite direction. 
The point estimates reveal that effect of the demand residual on unit cost is large, 
positive, and statistically significant. These correlations are consistent with the cost 
function defined in equation (16) and suggest that unit production costs are increasing 
                                                
47 Including labor and energy costs does not change the qualitative properties of the results. Capital 




in quality but decreasing in productivity. The estimates imply that the marginal cost 
function is concave in quality since the quality elasticity of cost, η, is estimated to be 
between 0 and 1. Finally, the variations in the demand residuals and productivity have 
much more explanatory power over the variation in unit costs when both are included. 
According to the R-squares, together changes in quality and productivity explain 42 
percent of the variation in unit costs while alone quality explains only 5 percent and 
productivity 21 percent. 
 
Table VII: Demand Residuals, Productivity, and Unit Cost 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Demand Residual 0.07  0.17 0.14 
  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
log TFP  -0.20 -0.30 -0.30 
   (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Demand residuals    0.04 
     x Scope for Differentiation    (0.004)*** 
Sample Size 107,115 107,115 107,115 107,115 
R2 0.05 0.21 0.42 0.70 
SE of reg. 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.25 
Notes: The dependent variable is the unit cost of production, defined as real material 
expenditures per unit of output. All regressions include a full set of product-by-year 
fixed effects. Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
The relative importance for unit production cost of productivity and quality 
should vary across products according to their potential for differentiation. For 
instance, for very homogenous products such as “hardwood plywood” (24351), the 
indirect effect of productivity through quality might be almost inoperative compared 




important role in consumer’s decision. In general, when the scope for vertical 
differentiation is limited, the direct effect of productivity on cost should be more 
important then its indirect effect through quality. In terms of the model, variation in 
product quality across producers implies variation in fixed production costs. 
Therefore, within-product dispersion in advertising expenditure across producers 
should be a good indicator of the potential for vertical differentiation in a particular 
product class. Intuitively, an industry in which dispersion in advertising expenditure 
across plants is high is likely characterized by high vertical product differentiation. 
Column (4) tests this idea by including an interaction of the demand residual with the 
within-product standard deviation of the revenue share of advertising expenditure 
across plants. As can be seen from column (4), the impact of the demand residual on 
costs is more important for products with a higher potential for differentiation. While 
more differentiated goods may have higher unit costs, the increase in the elasticity of 
unit cost with respect to quantity produced provides additional support for the quality 
interpretation. 
Overall the results presented in this section are compelling evidence that the time 
invariant demand residuals contain some information about the product attributes or 
at the very least about the consumer’s willingness to pay for the product. For 
simplicity, the demand residuals will be referred to as quality for the rest of the paper. 
 
3.4.2 Quality, Productivity, and Price 
This section investigates the link between product q ality and producer characteristics 




the model is the positive correlation between firm productivity and product quality. 
Intuitively, the return to quality upgrading is increasing in the plant’s productivity 
since higher productivity plants face relatively lower marginal costs and, as a result, 
can charge lower prices and sell more units. The association between quality and 
productivity can be evaluated formally by estimating the following equation: 
jtjt10j eˆlnν̂ +ϕξ+ξ= , (18)
where ν̂  is the estimated product quality, ϕ̂ is the estimated plant productivity, 0ξ  
denotes a full set of product-by-year fixed effects, and e represents unspecified 
factors affecting quality. As predicted, an increase in productivity leads to a positive 
and statistically significant increase in product quality. This result implies that the 
component of the plant’s output unexplained by its level of inputs (the productivity 
measure) is positively related to the component of demand unexplained by its price 
(the quality measure). 
According to the pricing rule, defined in equation (5), productivity affects price 
through two interrelated channels: cost and quality. On the one hand, the plant 
forwards productivity gains to the consumer. On theother hand, the increase in 
production costs associated with producing high quality goods will be reflected by a 
proportional increase in price. Adding a multiplicat ve error term to the pricing rule 
and taking logs provides the following regression equation: 
jtjt2jt10jt eˆlnν̂pln +ϕξ+ξ+ξ= , (19)
where p is the unit price of output, ν̂  is the estimated demand residual, which serves 
as a proxy for product quality, ϕ̂  is the estimated plant productivity, and e represents 




effect ( 0ξ ) to control for time-varying and time-invariant factors affecting all 
producers of a given product.  
The results from estimating regression equation (19) are presented in Table VIII. 
The first two columns report the results of regressing price on fixed effects and one 
either quality or TFP. As expected, the quality elasticity of price is positive and 
statistically significant while the impact of productivity is negative and significant. 
Column (3) reports the results for a specification including quality and productivity 
simultaneously. The estimated effects are statistically significant and larger in 
absolute value when both quality and productivity are included in the regression. This 
happens because the two effects of productivity on price work in opposite directions. 
Finally, as can be seen from column (4), the effect of productivity through quality is 
more important for products with a higher potential for differentiation, measured as 
above using the within-product dispersion in advertising expenditure across plants. 
According to the theoretical model, the coefficients on quality in equations (17) 
and (19) should be equal, since the quality elasticity of unit production cost and the 
quality elasticity of price are both equal to η. Comparing the estimates presented in 
Table VII and VIII reveals that these are indeed of similar magnitudes. The fact that 
the impacts of the demand residual on cost and price are positive and of similar 
magnitudes provides strong evidence that a mechanism of the type described in the 
quality model is at work: Producers can influence consumer’s willingness to pay at 
some cost, and maximize their profit by balancing the gain in demand associated with 





Table VIII: Quality, Productivity, and Price 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log Quality 0.10  0.19 0.16 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
log TFP  -0.18 -0.29 -0.29 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Log Quality    0.04 
       x Scope for Differentiation    (0.003)*** 
Sample size 107,115 107,115 107,115 107,115 
R2 0.13 0.24 0.64 0.64 
SE of reg. 0.39 0.37 0.25 0.20 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressing price on the tim invariant 
demand residual and productivity. All regressions include product-by-year fixed 
effects. Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis. The symbol  *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
As argued in the introduction, using unit values to make inferences about product 
quality could lead to invalid conclusions since a high unit value could arise from high 
quality or low productivity. To give a sense of whet r price is an accurate indicator 
of quality, observations are divided into four groups using product-level medians as a 
separation point: high price and high quality, high price and low quality, low price 
and high quality and low price and low quality. If price is a good indicator of quality 
the observations would mostly fall into the high/high and low/low categories. Pooling 
all the observations together, these groups account for only 27 percent of the 
observations each. Using finer bins (e.g. quartiles or deciles) to classify the 
observations reveals that price is not a good indicator of quality even in the extreme 
parts of the distribution. Therefore, while price does contain information on vertical 





3.4.3 Product Quality and Export Status 
This section explores the relationship between productivity, quality and export status. 
It begins by presenting descriptive statistics comparing exporting to non-exporting 
plants. It then develops and estimates a Probit model that is used to evaluate the 
separate impact of productivity and quality on the probability of export. The analysis 
presented in this section uses only a subset of the data since the CM contains plant-
level information on export only for years 1987 onward. Plants that report positive 
export revenue are classified as exporters.48 
To begin, the observations are divided into two categories according to their 
export status. Exporters and non-exporters are then compared using the differences in 
log means of price, output, cost, revenue and productivity across groups normalized 
by the standard deviation of the variable. Formally, the statistic is defined as 
)z(se/)zz( NXX −  where iz  is the mean of the log of variable Z in group i and 
NXX zzz ∪≡ . The statistics presented in Table IX confirm well-known results: 
exporters are larger in terms of output and revenue and are more productive on 
average; see for instance Bernard and Jensen (1999). Less well known facts are that 
exporters have slightly higher unit production costs and charge higher prices on 
average. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model. From equation (7), 
exporters produce varieties of higher quality. Therefore, whenever the direct effect of 
productivity on cost is smaller than its indirect effect through quality, costs and prices 
will be higher for exporters. 
                                                
48 Since export information is available at the plant level only, for multi-product plants it is impossible 
to know for sure if the plant’s export revenue comes from the product of interest or another product. 
However, since the sample includes only multi-product plants for which at least 50 percent of their 





Table IX: Exporting vs. Non Exporting Plants 
Price Cost Quantity Revenue TFP 
0.06 0.05 0.43 0.48 0.34 
Notes: This table shows the normalized differences 
between the means of exporting and non exporting plants. 
All variables are in logs. Product-by-year fixed effects are 
removed before computing the statistics. 
 
As the theoretical model makes clear, firms enter th  export market only if the 
extra profit from exporting is positive. From equation (15) it is possible to define the 













where xω  is defined in (7). The variable jtT  measures the ratio of variable export 
profits to the fixed export costs for plant j in year t. By definition, positive exports are 
observed if and only if T > 1. Adding a multiplicative error term and taking logs 
yields: 
jtjt2j1tjt elnlnωTln +ϕξ+ξ+ξ= ,     where ),0(N~e
2




−≡ξ , 1)η(ε11 −−≡ξ , and 1ε2 −≡ξ . Although jtTln  is 
unobserved, the presence of trade flows is observed. D fine the indicator variable X 
to equal 1 when the plant exports and 0 when it does not. Let jtχ  be the probability 
that plant j exports at time t, conditional on the observed variables and define the 
following Probit equation from (20): 




where )(⋅Φ  is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution, and every hat coefficient 
represents the original coefficient divided by 2eσ . This transformation ensures that the 
error is distributed standard normal. 
Results from estimating Probit equation (21) are prsented in Table X. The first 
two columns each include one regressor in addition to a full set of product/year fixed 
effects. As predicted quality has a large, positive and significant impact on the 
probability of exporting. Column (3) includes quality and productivity in the 
regression simultaneously. As expected, the impact of quality is now smaller than 
before, as part of the overall impact of TFP is now captured through its indirect effect 
on quality. Finally, from column (4), the impact ofquality on export status is not 
affected by the scope for vertical product differentiation. 
 
Table X: Quality, Productivity, and Export Status 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log Quality 0.23  0.19 0.19 
  (0.006)***  (0.008)*** (0.01)*** 
log TFP  0.19 0.09 0.09 
   (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
log Quality    0.002 
      x Scope for Differentiation    (0.002) 
Sample Size 49,639 49,639 49,639 49,639 
Log Likelihood -19027 -19448 -18950 -18920 
Notes: This table presents the results of Probit regression . The dependent variable is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the plant is classified as an exporter and 0 otherwise. All 
regressions include product-by-year fixed effects. Bootstrap standard errors are in 






While in theory the demand residuals are estimates of product quality, in practice they 
are likely to include information on other factors that could also influence the demand 
for a particular variety. This section controls forsome of these factors and evaluates 
the impact on the estimates effects of product quality. 
First, it is possible that some markets areas are regional in nature such that firms 
in certain locations face different conditions than firms in other. For instance, 
Syverson (2004) describes how differences in the density of demand affect the 
distribution of plant productivity in markets characterized by regional segmentation. 
If plants compete in different markets it is likely that the demand residuals will 
capture some regional characteristics and introduce a bias in the estimation of quality. 
To control for this possibility a set of regional fixed effect are included in the 
regressions. Regions are defined according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 
definition of Labor Market Areas. This measure of geo raphy is superior to political 
division such as State or Counties since it is developed from commuting patterns. It 
therefore better captures the economic interactions between groups of producers and 
consumers. Results are presented in Table XI. For space consideration only a subset 
of the estimated coefficients are presented. Overall removing regional variation from 
the demand residuals does not affect the results. Quality remains positively related to 
advertising expenditure, unit production cost, productivity, price and export 
probability. 
Second, because it takes time for consumers to learn about new products, older 




Table XI: Robustness I – Regional Variation in Demand 
Dependent: log Quality log Cost log Quality log Price Export Status 
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log Advertising 0.24     
  (0.006)***     
log Quality  0.13  0.19 0.19 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.008)*** 
log TFP  -0.35 0.58 -0.29 0.10 
   (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** 
Sample size 30,444 105,409 105,409 105,409 47,960 
R2 0.08 0.64 0.21 0.65  
Log Likelihood     -17810 
 Notes: All regressions include regional fixed effects. Regions are defined according to the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis’ definition of Labor Market Areas. The dependent variable for each regression 
is listed at the top of each column. All regression i clude a full set of product/year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance above 10, 
5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008b) find empirical support for this conjecture using 
U.S Census micro data on manufacturing plants. The model does not account for the 
accumulation of quality capital such as brand recognition or consumer habit but rather 
concentrates on the contemporaneous relationship between production costs and 
demand. Therefore regressions a measure of plant age is included in the regressions to 
partial out the fraction of residual demand explained by learning and reputation. Since 
plant age cannot be measured accurately in the sample, observations are divided into 
three categories: plants appearing for the first time in a Census are classified as 
young, plants that appeared in at least two but not m re than four Censuses are 




as old.49 Results for regressions including plant age dummies ar  presented in Table 
XII. While the effect of age on demand is generally statistically significant, 
controlling for plant age variation does not affect the results. Quality remains 
positively related to advertising expenditure, unit production cost, productivity, price 
and export probability. 
 
Table XII: Robustness II – Learning and Reputation 
Dependent: log Quality log Quality log Cost log Quality log Price Export Status 
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log Advertising   0.22         
    (0.006)***         
log Quality     0.12   0.19 0.14 
      (0.001)***   (0.002)*** (0.006)*** 
log TFP     -0.35 0.57 -0.29 0.96 
      (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** 
Young 0.043 -0.017 0.03 -0.016 0.02 -0.11 
  (0.01)*** (0.02) (0.003)*** (0.02) (0.002)*** (0.02)*** 
Medium 0.36 0.28 0.05 0.17 0.0059  
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*   
Old -0.23 -0.27 -0.02 -0.14 -0.001 -0.22 
  (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.002) (0.02)*** 
Sample size 107115 32083 107115 107115 107115 49639 
R2 0.02 0.07 0.64 0.19 0.64   
Log Likelihood           -21378 
 Notes: The dependent variable for each regression i  listed at the top of each column. All 
regressions include product/year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The medium aged 
dummy is excluded to remove collinearity with the constant. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance above 10, 5, and 1 percent r spectively. 
 
                                                
49 This classification is based on the plant’s age which is computed from the entire Census of 




Finally, although five-digit SIC product category provides narrow definitions of 
industries, there still remains horizontal differentiation of an unwanted type. For 
instance the product class “wood bedroom furniture” (SIC 25115) comprises beds, 
dressers and night tables. In that case comparing the output and average unit value 
across plants leads to incorrect inferences whenever there is heterogeneity across 
plants in the bundle of furniture produced. To account for the impact of horizontal 
differentiation a new sample that contains only products classified as not horizontally 
differentiated by Rauch (1999) is constructed. Regressions are re-estimated in that 
sample. The results are presented in Table XIII. Overall results are robust to these 
changes in sample. Quality remains positively related to advertising expenditure, unit 
production cost, productivity, price and export probability. 
 
Table XIII: Robustness III – Removing Horizontal Differentiation 
Dependent: log Quality log Cost log Quality log Price Export Status 
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log Advertising 0.20         
  (0.01)***         
log Quality   0.19   0.25 0.20 
    (0.002)***   (0.002)*** (0.01)*** 
log TFP   -0.34 0.60 -0.31 0.10 
    (0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.01)*** 
Sample size 9,763 32,467 32,467 32,467 14,943 
R2 0.06 0.26 0.29 0.71  
Log Likelihood     -18931 
Notes: The dependent variable for each regression as well as the estimation procedure is listed at 
the top of each column. All regressions include product/year fixed effects. Standard errors are in 






 Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that the conclusions are 
robust to the inclusion of additional factors in the analysis. Quality remains positively 
related to advertising expenditure, unit production c st, productivity, price and export 
probability even when regional variation in demand and plant age plant age are 
controlled for or when the sample is and hold even in very homogenously defined 
product classes. 
  
3.5 Structural Estimation 
The last section presented correlations between productivity, quality, price, and 
export status consistent with the theory. However, as mentioned previously, the 
demand residuals that serve as proxy for quality are likely to contain more than just 
information about product quality. Therefore, while the empirical findings are 
compelling evidence of a link between producer behavior and consumer demand it is 
not clear that this relationship is due exclusively to vertical product differentiation. 
Therefore the estimated conditional covariance present d in the last section may 
overstate the importance of quality. As an alternative, this section uses the simulated 
method of moments (SMM) to estimate the model’s structural parameters, evaluate 
the ability of the model to reproduce observed facts and assess the importance of 
vertical product differentiation. If the model captures the essential characteristics of 
the industry the simulated moments should be close t  the data moments. In that 
sense SMM provides an interesting test of the model. Further, the importance of 
quality differentiation can be evaluated by looking at the estimated values for the 




procedure, the quality elasticity of fixed and marginal costs should be close to zero if 
there is no quality differentiation. 
Another reason to estimate the model structurally using SMM is that this allows 
for counterfactual experiments. Once the estimates for the parameters are known, the 
model can be used to evaluate the effect of exogenous shocks on industry 
characteristics such as average price and the productivity distribution. The analysis 
focus on the effect of three different types of trade liberalization: (i) A ten percent 
decrease in the variable trade cost; (ii) A ten percent decrease in the fixed trade cost; 
(iii) A ten percent decrease in both variable and fixed trade costs. Overall the results 
show that trade costs are important determinants of plant behavior. 
3.5.1 Calibration 
The model is governed by 10 parameters that can be divided into 5 categories: 
demand (ε and L), productivity (σ), entry/exit (fe, δ), technology (fc, γ, and η) and 
trade costs (τ, and fx). Some of the parameters can be fixed a priori or calibrated to 
match data moments directly. This reduces the parameter space to a manageable size 
for the estimation. The remainder of the subsection explains the choice of calibrated 
values for the parameters, which are summarized in Table XIV. 
The total revenue (R) is equal to the product of the wage rate and the size of the 
population (L) and is normalized to 1 without loss of generality. The probability of 
exit (δ) is calibrated to 0.13 to match the sample’s estimated annual exit rate.50 The 
                                                
50 The exit rate is computed by looking at fraction of plants in year t that exit between t and t + 5, the




elasticity of substitution (ε) is set to 2.46.51 The theory shows that the producer’s 
share of revenue from exports is a function of the elasticity of substitution and the 














In theory this share is constant across producers, but in practice there is a lot of 
dispersion across exporters. Hence, the revenue-weighted share of revenue from 
export among all exporters is used to estimate xS . This share is equal to 0.35 in the 
full sample. Taking into account the calibrated value for the elasticity of substitution, 
this implies an iceberg transport cost parameter (τ) of 1.53. According to this 
estimate, the price of a domestic variety will be 53 percent higher when sold in the 
foreign market. This is a relatively high but not ttally unreasonable increment. 
 
Table XIV: Fixed Parameters for Simulation 
Parameter Definition Value Source 
ε Elasticity of substitution 2.46 Data 
τ Iceberg trade Cost 1.53 Data 
δ Probability of Exit 0.13 Data 
fe Fixed Entry Cost N Normalization 
fc Lower bound of fixed production cost 1 Normalization 
L Population size 1 Normalization 
Notes: This table presents the values for parameters that are selected a priori or calibrated 
directly to match data moments. The elasticity of substitution, the iceberg trade cost and the 
probability of exit are estimated from the full sample (107,115 observations). The constant N 
is equal to the size of the random sample used to approximate the distribution of productivity. 
 
                                                
51 This value is obtained by estimating equation (16) in the full sample following the procedure used to 





Finally, the model does not allow the identification f all fixed costs parameter. 
Hence, the fixed entry cost (fe) and the lower bound on the fixed production (fc) are 
normalized.52 To understand this result, first note that the fixed entry cost (fe) only 
appears in equation (14), characterizing the productivity threshold (φo), while the 
fixed production cost enters both in (14) and in equation (12) characterizing the 
export threshold (κ). Therefore any change in the entry cost can be offset by a 
proportional change in the fixed production and export cost such that the productivity 
threshold is unchanged. Also the export threshold is a function only of the ratio of the 
fixed export to the fixed production cost. Therefor for the current purposes there are 
redundancies in the parameters. The lower bound of the fixed production cost is 
normalized to 1. Since the fixed entry cost controls the size of the industry its value 
should be proportional to number of firms used in the computational sample. If this is 
not the case only a small fraction of the entrants produce in equilibrium.53 For 
simplicity, the fixed entry cost (fe) is set to N, the number of random draws used to 
approximate the productivity distribution.  
The remaining four parameters (σ, fx, γ, and η) capture the core mechanisms of 
the model and are estimated using SMM. The shape parameter of the productivity 
distribution (σ) measures the dispersion in productivity across producers in the 
industry. The fixed export cost controls the partitioning of plants along export status. 
                                                
52 The innocuous nature of calibrating these fixed costs can be verified graphically and numerically. 
Plots of the objective criterion evaluated at the optimal parameter values as a function of each of the 
fixed cost are U shaped. Further, the numerical derivatives of the objective criterion are almost 
identical to zero when evaluated at the optimal parameter values. These are evidence that the objective 
is minimized at the calibrated values. 
53 In other words, when the fixed entry cost is small on y a small fraction of the random draws used to 
approximate the distribution of productivity will survive to affect the equilibrium. When this happens 




Finally, the quality elasticities of fixed and varible cost (γ and η) govern the 
relationship between quality, production cost and price. 
3.5.2 Moments 
At least one moment condition per estimated parameter is required for the system to 
be identified. There is a large set of moments to ch ose from in the data and the 
econometric theory does not provide a clear guide in the choice of an optimal set of 
moments to use. Therefore moments are selected based on two criteria. First, they 
should capture the essential characteristics of the industry that the model tries to 
explain. Second, they should provide enough information to identify the structural 
parameters of the model. In other words, variations in parameter values should result 
in different values for the simulated moments. 
The first three moments are the differences in log mean price, quantity, and 
revenue between high and low quality variety producers, normalized by each 
variable’s standard deviation. Since the theoretical model is built to explain the 
relationship between the distributions of price, revenue, and quality, these statistics 
capture important features of the data and should inform the structural parameters of 
the model. The distribution of output is very asymmetrical in the data. To more fully 
capture this property, the shares of revenue accounted for by the top 10 percent, the 
top 20 percent and the top 50 percent of producers are included as additional 
moments in the estimation process. Finally, the share of exporting plants in the 
sample is also included since it is likely to convey useful information about the fixed 





It is important to recall that quality is not directly observed in the data. The 
empirical analysis estimated a proxy for quality by including a producer fixed effect 
in a 2SLS regression of quantity on price using productivity as an instrument. For 
consistency, the same procedure is used to construct a proxy for quality in the 
simulated data. There is one important difference, however. In the data productivity is 
a Solow residual, defined as the log difference betwe n quantity produced and an 
index of inputs implied by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function. In the model this residual would be exactly equal to productivity since there 
is only one input. Therefore, in the simulated data, productivity is simply defined as a 
random draw from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter σ. 
The data moments are computed from the full sample and summarized in Table 
XV. As mentioned earlier plants classified as high quality producers are different 
from plants classified as low quality producers. On average high quality plants charge 
prices half a standard deviation above low quality plants and have quantity and 
revenue more than one standard deviation above low quality producers. The 
asymmetry of the revenue distribution across producers is evidenced by the next three 
moments. About 67 percent of the overall revenue is accounted for by the largest 10 
percent of producers while the top half of producers account for 96 percent of overall 
revenue. Finally, about 19 percent of plants in the sample are classified as exporters. 
 
3.5.3 Estimation 
The SMM estimation procedure is briefly described hre; more details can be found 




1. Calculate the vector of moments with the actual data, )(M θ .  
2. For a given vector of parameters θ̂ , simulate the model using N realizations 
of random draws to approximate the productivity distribution and generate 
artificial data. 
3. Use the artificial data to calculate the vector of simulated moments, )ˆ(M θ . 
4. Compare the vectors of moments from the actual and simulated data and 
search over the parameter space Θ for the solution to the following 
minimization problem:54 
)]ˆ(M)(M[ W ])ˆ(M)(M[ minargˆ θθθθθ −′−≡
Θ
, (22)
where the matrix W provides the weight given to each of the moments in the 
optimization procedure.  
To obtain an efficient estimator for θ  the weights are inversely proportional to the 
standard deviation of the data moments, so that more precisely estimated moments 
are given more weight in the estimation.55 
Even with the most powerful of computers there is aconstraint on the number of 
draws that can be used to approximate the productivity distribution. This implies that 
simulation error is always present to some degree in the simulated method of moment 
estimates. The estimation procedure takes this into acc unt and is repeated ten times 
using different starting values and sets of random draws.56 In each simulation ten 
thousand random draws are used to approximate the distribution of productivity 
                                                
54 The optimization algorithm is the simulated annealing method described in Goffe et al. (1994). 
55 See Adda and Cooper (2003) for a precise definition of W. Since the variance-covariance matrix of 
the moments is unobserved it must be estimated. See app ndix for details. 




across plants.57 Each SMM estimation leads to a vector of parameter bθ̂  that solves 
equation (22).  
 






Standard deviation difference in log mean price 0.52 0.54 (0.02) 
Standard deviation difference in log mean quantity 1.12 1.19 (0.03) 
Standard deviation difference in log mean revenue 1.28 1.39 (0.03) 
Share of revenue top 10% percent 0.67 0.22 (0.005) 
Share of revenue top 20% percent 0.81 0.35 (0.007) 
Share of revenue top 50% percent 0.96 0.63 (0.006) 
Share of exporters 0.19 0.46 (0.009) 
Notes: This table shows the moments computed from actual data and the mean and 
standard deviation of the simulated moments. The data moments are computed from 
the full sample of 107,115 observations. The model moments are averages across ten 
independent estimations using SMM. 
 
The means and standard deviations of the simulated moments evaluated at the 
optimal values are presented in Table XV. The small st ndard deviations indicate that 
the estimates are robust to changes in random draws and tarting values. The model is 
able to reproduce the dispersion is size and output price across manufacturing plants 
observed in the data. The simulated normalized differences in log mean price, 
quantity and revenue are all very close to their actual values. This suggests that the 
model captures factors causing quality differences across plants, a comforting finding 
given that the theoretical model is built towards explaining such differences. Further, 
the simulated distribution of revenue across the top deciles of producers has a shape 
                                                
57 To mimic the empirical procedure the distribution is truncated using a five median rule. 
Productivities above five times and below one fifth of the median productivity are dropped for the 
estimation procedure. This condition is binding only when the shape parameter of the productivity 
distribution (σ) is low. At the estimated optimal values of the parameters it is not binding so that all 




similar to the actual distribution in that the biggest producers in the simulated data 
account for a disproportionate fraction of total revenue. However, the magnitudes of 
the simulated shares of output for the largest producers are lower than their actual 
values. One likely culprit is the assumption that the world is composed of only two 
symmetric countries. If instead the world was composed of several destinations, the 
difference between exporters and non-exporters would be amplified, as exporters’ 
share of output sold abroad would increase thereby increasing there relative size. 
Since exporters are the biggest producers in the economy, this would increase the 
share of revenue accounted for by the top deciles of pr ducers. Further, if each 
foreign destination was characterized by different fixed and variable trade costs, there 
would be multiple export thresholds, so that only the most efficient of exporters 
would export to the toughest destinations. This would generate additional variation in 
revenue and increase the relative size of very highproductivity plants. Finally, the 
model has difficulty in matching the share of exporters in the sample. In the data only 
19 percent of plants export, while in the simulated data 46 percent of plants export. 
Since exporters are more productive and quality is increasing in productivity, this 
implies that all exporters in the simulated data are classified as high quality plants. 
The high simulated value for the share of exporters r veals that the model uses the 
discontinuity in the mapping from productivity to quality at the export margin to 
generate variation in normalized log means across high and low quality producers. 
Despite its limitations, the simple general equilibrium model including vertical 
product differentiation captures some important features of the data. The criterion 




The means and standard deviations of the estimated parameters underlying the 
simulated moments are reported in Table XVI. The small standard deviations indicate 
that the estimates are robust to changes in random draws and starting values. This 
suggests that the estimates of the structural parameters attain the global minimum of 
the objective function (22). The quality elasticities of unit cost (η) and fixed 
production costs (γ) are estimated at 0.1 and 1.29 respectively. The point estimates 
imply that a ten percent increase in quality leads to 1 percent increase in marginal 
production costs and a 13 percent increase in fixed production costs. From 
proposition (3), the convexity of the mapping from quality to fixed production costs 
implies that price and productivity are negatively correlated in equilibrium, a finding 
consistent with the data. Both quality elasticity estimates are statistically significantly 
different than zero at conventional levels. Since these parameters are left unrestricted 
in the estimation procedure, this is strong evidence that vertical product 
differentiation contributes significantly in explaining the variation in producer 
characteristics. Finally, it interesting to note that the structural estimate of the quality 
elasticity of marginal production costs (η) is not far from the OLS estimates presented 
in Tables VII and VIII respectively. 
The shape parameter of the Pareto distribution is estimated at 12.8, a value 
equal to the upper bound of the range of estimates pr ented in the studies of Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramaz (2008).58 Since a high value of 
                                                
58 Eaton et al. (2008) find a value of 2.5 by calibrating a model using French micro data. Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) presents three separate estimates of 3.6, 8.3 and 12.8 obtained using different 
approaches in aggregate data and Bernard et al. (2003) find a value of 3.6 by calibrating a model using 
U.S. Census micro data. The last two studies use the Fréchet extreme value distribution instead of the 
Pareto. However, as argued in the appendix to chapter 2, the two distributions are related so that the 




the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution implies less dispersion in 
productivity, the relatively high estimated value is consistent with the idea that 
quality acts as a multiplier on the effect of productivity – it compounds the 
comparative advantage effect of productivity, so that a smaller amount of dispersion 
in random productivity is needed to generate the observed degree of inequality in 
revenue and output. Further, the average fixed cost of production can be calculated 
as ηω+ ˆcf . Evaluated at the optimal values of the structural parameters this average 
is equal to 80.6, or about 19 percent of average rev nue in the industry. Finally the 
fixed export cost is estimated at 47.3, so that in the simulated data the fixed export 
cost is equal to about 59 percent of the average fixed production cost and 10 percent 
of the average revenue.  
 
Table XVI: Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Definition Mean Std.Dev 
η Quality elasticity of unit production costs 0.10 (0.02) 
γ Quality elasticity of fixed production costs 1.29 (0.01) 
σ Shape parameter of Pareto distribution 12.8 (1.59) 
fx Fixed trade cost 47.3 (3.15) 
Notes: This table presents the means and standard deviations across the ten 
simulations of the parameter estimates obtained using SMM. 
 
The theoretically accurate measure of product quality, defined in equation (7), 
can be calculated in the simulated data. This allows for a comparison in the 
simulated data between the proxy for quality and the “true” measure of quality 
based on the theoretical model. Evaluated at the optimal parameter values the 




note that this is likely to be a biased estimate of the correlation between the two 
measures in the actual data, because the actual and simulated procedures differ in 
certain respects. First, in the actual data, quality is estimated by including a 
producer fixed effect in a regression of quantity on price. In the simulated data only 
one observation per plant is available, so quality is defined as the residual from the 
same regression omitting producer fixed effects. Second, as explained earlier, the 
“true” plant productivity – defined from the random draw – is observed in the 
simulated data whereas it needs to be estimated in the actual data. Third, in the 
simulation there are no plant factors other than price and quality affecting demand, 
while in the real world there are many. Finally, there is no measurement error in the 
model. Together, these considerations imply that the procedure might identify the 
quality component more accurately in the simulated data than in actual data. 
Nevertheless, the high estimated correlation suggests that using demand residuals as 
a proxy for quality is a reasonable empirical strategy. 
3.5.4 Counterfactuals 
The estimated model can be used to perform counterfactual experiments. Of 
particular interest is the impact of trade liberaliz t on on the distributions of price, 
quality and productivity across manufacturing plants. The analysis here considers 
three different types of liberalization: a 10 percent decrease in variable trade cost (τ),
a 10 percent decrease in fixed trade costs (fx), and a 10 percent decrease in both 
variable and fixed trade costs. Throughout the analysis, the random draws used to 




measured changes are due to general-equilibrium effects and not changes in the 
underlying heterogeneity.  
The effects of trade liberalization on productivity are summarized in Table XVII. 
In all cases, a decrease in trade costs lowers the productivity threshold above which 
plants decide to enter the foreign market. For insta ce, a ten percent decrease in the 
iceberg trade cost reduces the minimum productivity required to enter the export 
market profitably by about 2 percent and increases th  number of exporters by about 
5.5 percent. Because exporters expand their producti n in response to new profit 
opportunities, the demand for labor goes up, forcing marginally profitable plants out 
of the industry. Therefore the number of producers in equilibrium goes down. In 
particular, a ten percent decrease in the iceberg trade cost decreases the number of 
incumbents by about 12 percent. Responses are qualitatively similar for a 10 percent 
decline in the fixed trade cost. 
 
Table XVII: Counterfactual 
 -10% in τ -10% in fx -10% in τ and fx 
Export threshold (φx) -1.81 -2.75 -4.50 
Number of exporters 5.50 17.8 24.4 
Number of producers -12.0 -10.9 -22.8 
Mean Price 4.18 4.37 8.99 
Mean Quantity -4.26 -4.11 -8.08 
Mean Quality 4.01 -0.15 3.21 
Notes: This table presents the effect of three types of trade liberalization. The mean 
price is computed by dividing total revenue by total quantity consumed, which is equal 
to the quantity produced minus the output used to pay the variable export cost. The 
mean quality is the average quality of a unit of output. 
 
 
Trade liberalization also has a significant impact on the characteristics of the 




average unit purchased. For example, a 10 percent decrease in transport costs leads to 
a 4 percent increase in price. The impact on quality varies across the type of trade 
liberalization. While a ten percent decrease in variable trade costs raises the quality of 
the average unit consumed by about 4 percent, a tenpercent decrease in fixed export 
costs has almost no effect on quality. From equation (7), a decrease in transport cost 
increases the optimal quality conditional on productivity. Therefore, as transport cost 
goes down more plants enter the export market and the quality of varieties produced 
by exporters goes up. This implies that the average quality of consumption goes up. 
However, fixed export costs affect quality only indirectly – through their impact on 
the price index (P) included in the constant A. A decrease in fixed exports cost 
increases the share of exporting firms, but the share of output for export and the 
quality of exported varieties is almost unchanged. The overall impact on quality is 
therefore negligible.  
Finally, trade decreases the overall consumption of differentiated product in 
equilibrium. This happens for two reasons. First, when trade impediments are lower 
the share of production for export increases. This implies that more output is lost in 
transportation. Second, following trade liberalization, the typical consumer substitutes 
higher quality imported varieties for low quality domestic varieties. Therefore the 
consumption basket becomes smaller but contains better products.  
Overall the changes in price, quality and quantity consumed increase consumer 
welfare. The estimated impact is small however (less then one percent). The rise in 
welfare associated with a ten percent decrease in transport cost is due to the increase 








This chapter makes three significant contributions. First, it develops a tractable 
general equilibrium model that includes vertical product differentiation in a 
heterogeneous producer framework. The theory clearly demonstrates how 
productivity affects price and export status through two distinct channels: directly by 
reducing unit production costs and indirectly by increasing quality. Second, using the 
theory as a guide, the chapter develops a novel empirical strategy to obtain a proxy 
for quality and uses it to evaluate the importance of vertical product differentiation in 
explaining observed price and export patterns. The empirical findings are consistent 
with the model: (i) On average, quality is positively correlated with unit cost and 
price; (ii) On average, productivity is negatively correlated with unit production costs 
and output price and positively correlated with quality; (iii) Quality, in addition to 
productivity, is an important determinant of the plant’s export status. Finally, the 
chapter uses the simulated method of moments to obtain additional evidence of the 
presence and importance of product quality differentiation. According to the 
structural estimates of the model’s parameters, margin l production costs are concave 
in quality while fixed production costs are convex in quality. Since the parameters are 
left unrestricted in the estimation, these findings support the idea that plants use 
quality as a mean to compete in the market. Further, t  results suggest that using 




at the optimal parameter values the correlation betwe n the theoretically accurate 
measure of quality and the constructed proxy estimated from the simulated data is 
above 0.9. 
Overall the results presented in this chapter provide strong support to the idea that 
within industry vertical product differentiation is important to explaining variation in 




Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
The dissertation uses theoretical, empirical and computational methods to study the 
role of product differentiation in shaping price dispersion and trade patterns observed 
in microdata on U.S manufacturing plants. Overall the hesis demonstrates that the 
potential for product quality differentiation has an important effect on the behavior of 
producer and the characteristics of the industry and should not be ignored. 
While the analysis is arguably an important contribution, it is clearly not 
exhaustive. Much remains to be done. For instance, evaluating the reduction in the 
welfare cost of trade liberalization would be an important avenue for future research. 
It is often argued that the long-run gains associated with trade liberalization can only 
be obtained at the expense of costly short-run adjustments. In particular, the loss in 
welfare due to worker reallocation is frequently cited by policy makers as a major 
hurdle to import tariff reduction. In the presence of vertical differentiation, quality 
upgrading is an important margin producers in develop d countries can exploit to 
resist low-wage import competition. Since worker relocation is likely to be easier 
within than across industries, within-industry specialization reduces the predicted 
welfare loss associated with the short-run adjustmen s. Quantitative estimates for the 
effect of quality on the short term adjustment cost associated with trade liberalization 
would be useful. 
Further, in industries characterized by vertical differentiation it is possible that 
firms manufacture an array of products of different quality within the same industry. 




response to differences in trade costs. Therefore, developing a model with multi-
quality firms could help explain the variation across export destinations in producer 






A. Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
A.1 The Closed Economy 
The zero-profit condition that determines the profitab lity threshold is given by 
0)( oo =ϕπ . From (7) this implies that: ooo f)(r ε=ϕ . Further, from (6), the ratio of 
revenue functions for firms with different productivity can be expressed as 
1ε
ooo )()(r)(r
−ϕ′ϕ=ϕ′ϕ , if they produce varieties of the same quality and 
1ε
oHoH ))(ΩΩ()(r)(r
−ϕ′ϕ=ϕ′ϕ  if one produces a high quality variety while the 
other produces a low quality variety. Replacing oϕ=ϕ′  it follows that: 
1ε
ooo )(εf)(r
−ϕϕ=ϕ      and     1εooHoH ))(ΩΩ(εf)(r
−ϕϕ=ϕ . 
These relations can be used to express average revenue as a function of the 
















































From the profit functions defined in (7) it must be th  case that f/r −ε=π , where the 








































































































Substituting for the equilibrium mass using (16) yields (17). 
 By definition of the revenue function, in equilibrium it must be the case that: 
oooooo f)(q)(p)(r ε=ϕϕ≡ϕ , where the equality follows from (10). This implies that 
the optimal quantity of low variety produced by the marginal entrant is given by: 
ooooo cρεf)(q ϕ=ϕ . From the optimal demand (2), and the pricing rule(5), it can be 
shown that:  
ε
oo )()(q)(q ϕ′ϕ=ϕ′ϕ  and )()()(q)(q oH
ε
oH ΩΩϕϕ′=ϕ′ϕ .  
Replacing oϕ=ϕ′ equation (18) is obtained. 
 
A.2 A Discussion of Assumption 2 
This subsection discusses the empirical validity of assumption 2 which state that 
ε>σ . On the one hand, a number of studies provide estimates for the elasticity of 
substitution (ε) in a CES demand context. Feenstra (1994) considers th  annual U.S 
imports of six manufactured products and presents es imates around 2 in absolute 
value. Bernard et al. (2003) calibrate a model to fit U. S. plants and macro trade data, 
report an estimated elasticity of 3.8. Broda and Weinst in (2006) using data on the 




around 5 for four-digit (SITC) Rauch-differentiated goods. Finally, using data on U.S. 
manufacturing plants chapter 3 obtains an estimate of 2.5 in absolute value. On the 
other hand, estimates for the productivity distribution are not as abundant. Eaton et al. 
(2008) obtain a value of 2.46 by calibrating a model using micro data on French 
firms. Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume that productivity follows a Fréchet 
distribution and calibrate a model to fit bilateral trade data on 19 OECD countries. 
Using three different approaches they obtain estimates of 3.60, 8.28 and 12.9. The 
next paragraph argues that these estimates can serve as indicator for the Pareto 
distribution’s shape parameter (σ). Overall these empirical estimates do not provide 
strong evidence against assumption 2 (ε>σ ) since the average shape parameter of 
the productivity distribution (σ) is greater than the average elasticity of substitution 
(ε). 
 Holding the distribution fixed, a larger sample of random variables is likely to 
have a larger maximum. In fact it can be formally demonstrated that the probability 
density function of the maximum tends to a limiting form: an extreme value 
distribution. For instance, the cumulative distribut on function (cdf) for the Pareto is: 
σ~1)~(G}~Pr{ −ϕ−=ϕ≡ϕ≤ϕ  for 1~ >ϕ , 0>σ . By definition, the cdf for the maximum, 
)m(maxϕ , is the probability that all of the m random draws are less than ϕ~ , so: 
m
maxmax )]
~(G[)~(G}~Pr{ ϕ=ϕ≡ϕ≤ϕ . Define the centralized variable: )m(amaxc ϕ≡ϕ , 
where /σ11 m)]m1(1[G)m(a =−≡ −  is a scale factor that provides the relationship 
between the supremum of the distribution and the sample maximum as a function of 












)~(exp σ−ϕ−= . Importantly, the Pareto and Fréchet distribution are function of the 
same unique shape parameter (σ).
 
A.3 The Correlation between Price and Productivity  
By definition ϕ−ϕϕ=ϕ−ϕ⋅−ϕ=ϕϕ p])(p[E)}(]p)(p{[E]),(pcov[  where E denotes 
the expectation operator and )var()](pvar[]),(pcov[]),(p[corr ϕϕϕϕ=ϕϕ . From the 
properties of the Pareto distribution it follows that the expected value of the product 
of the price and productivity is ρβ=ϕϕϕϕ≡ϕϕ ∫
∞
ϕ 3o




−− ∆+∆−≡β , while the average price and the average 














−−−− +−≡β . Similarly, the 





















−−−− ∆+∆−≡β . 
Equation (21) is obtained by combining these results. Note that since by assumption 
Ho cc <  and by definition 
σσ1σ2 ∆∆∆ −−−−− << , 1∆ >∀  it must be the case that 





A.4. The Open Economy 
By definition, the average extra profit earned in the export market, the average 
























































































oxxox d)µ()(pd)µ()(pd)(µ)(p)(p  
Taking into account the productivity distribution characteristics, equation (27), (29) 
and (37) follow. Since )(r)(r i
1x
i ϕτ=ϕ











−−− . Using this 
result and the fact that the firm-level production f high quality is given by 
)(q)()(q xooH
x
H ϕΩΩ=ϕ  it follows that the segment specific output for domestic and 







































d)µ()(qnMO . Using these results 
equation (32) and (35) are easily obtained. Finally note that )(q)(q i
x
i ϕτ=ϕ
ε− , such 








A.5 Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of proposition 1. From (14) it is easy to show that 0/V o
E <ϕ∂∂ , 
∞=→ϕ
E
0 Vlim o  and 0Vlim
E
o
=∞→ϕ . These results imply the expected value of entry 
monotonically goes from infinity to zero as the profitability threshold goes from zero 
to infinity. Since the equilibrium expected value of entry is fixed by the entry cost ef , 
there exists a unique value of the profitability threshold such that the free entry 
condition (14) is satisfied. □
Proof of proposition 3. The relative profitability of the high segment is increasing in 
oH/ΩΩ – a positive function of oH ωω  and a negative function of oH cc  – and 
decreasing in oH ff . Since, from (9) and (12), Λ is increasing in oH ΩΩ  and 
decreasing in oH ff  the mass of incumbent (M), defined in (16), is negatively related 
to the relative profitability of the high quality segment. □ 
Proof of proposition 4. First, from (18), it follows that 0/)(qi >ϕ∂ϕ∂  for }H,o{i ∈ . 
Second, at the transition cutoff it is the case that )(q)(q oHHoHo ϕ<ϕ  which implies that 
the quantity produced is increasing across segment. Together these results imply that 
there is a positive association between firm-level output and productivity. The same 
reasoning can be applied to (6) such that there is a positive association between firm-
level revenue and productivity. □ 
Proof of proposition 6. From (21) if 0),p(corr =ϕ  then 0)1(σσA 2
22
3 =β−−β≡ . 
The derivative of A with respect to σ  will therefore have the same sign as the 
price/productivity correlation evaluated at the point where 0),p(corr =ϕ . It can be 
shown that ]})1σ/[∆(σ21∆{ln∆)cc(σ)A/( 22σoH0)corr(p, −+−=∂∂
−
=ϕ




since by assumption 1∆ >  and oH cc > . It is important to note that 32 limlim β=β ∞→σ∞→σ  
such that A is always negative in the limiting case. □ 
Proof of proposition 7. The free entry condition (14) uniquely pins down oϕ as a 
function of model parameters. Since a move from autarky to costless trade does not 
change any of the parameters the profitability thres old is unaffected by this change. 
The export remains the same since ∆, defined in (9), and the profitability threshold 
oϕ  are unaffected by costless trade. Since the profitability and transition thresholds 
are unchanged every other variables remains the sam. □ 
Proof of proposition 8. From (26) it is easy to show that 0V o
E <ϕ∂∂ , 
∞=→ϕ
E
0 Vlim o  and 0Vlim
E
o
=∞→ϕ . Therefore the expected value of entry 
monotonically goes from infinity to zero as the profitability threshold goes from zero 
to infinity. Since the equilibrium expected value of entry is fixed by the entry cost ef , 
there exists a unique value of the profitability threshold such that the free entry 
condition (28) is satisfied. □
Proof of proposition 9. Part (i): From (12) and (29) it follows that 
Brr AutarkyTradeCostly +=  where ox
ε1 fεΛnτ])εσ1(σ[B −−+≡  is greater than zero 
whenever trade occurs. Hence the average revenue is gr ater under costly trade than 
under autarky. By definition, the costly trade open economy average profit is given 
by πππ xx >ξ+ . Further, from (28), the open economy profitability threshold can be 
expressed as  fδ)π∆π( e
xσ
xo
−σ +≡ϕ  and by definition of the Pareto distribution the 
average productivity – which is given by o])1([ ϕ−σσ  – is increasing in the 




the profitability threshold as well as the average productivity is greater in the costly 
trade open economy. □ 
 Part (ii): Part (i) established that, as long as some firms are exporting, the 
profitability threshold is higher in the costly trade open economy. This implies that 
firms with productivity between the autarky threshold and the costly trade open 
economy threshold will exit the industry. Also since the ratio ∆ is unaffected by trade 
the transition productivity cutoff ooH ϕ∆≡ϕ  will also be greater under costly trade. 
This implies that firms with productivity between the autarky transition threshold and 
the costly trade open economy transition threshold will move down the quality ladder 
and start producing a low quality variety. □ 
 Part (iii):  When all countries are identical the aggregate revenue is the same 
under costly trade and autarky such that the increase in average revenue implies that 
the mass of incumbent must go down in costly trade – Recall that r/RM = . Since 
from (33), the relative number of firms in each segm nt is unaffected by trade, costly 
trade reduces the number of firm in each segment as well as overall. □ 




− . This implies that AutarkyT MM <  if and 
only if σε− ∆Λ<Λ xx
1τ . Note that by assumption 1−ε>σ , 1ff ox
1
x
1 >=∆τ −εε− , and 





































































It follows that σε− ∆Λ<Λ xx
1τ  such that the mass of firms competing in each market is 
lower in costly trade than in autarky. □ 
























e CostlyTrad ,   
with 1)∆(1)∆(∆B σεσεσεx >−−≡
−−− , where inequality follows since 1x >∆ . Hence, the 
ratio of high to low quality output is higher under costly trade than under autarky. □ 
 Part (vi): From part (iv) the average quality of the domestic production is higher. 
From proposition 10, the average quality of exports is greater than the average quality 
of varieties produced for domestic sales. Since consumption is the same in every 
country and equal to a mix of domestic and imported varieties, it must be the case that 
the quality of consumption if greater than the quality of varieties produced for 
domestic sale. □ 














































Since, by assumption 1x >∆  and 0>ε−σ  it follows that 1∆x <








o OOOO <  which is equivalent to equation (34). □ 
 
A.6 The impact of Trade Liberalization 
From (28), the equilibrium condition can be expressed as: 










−− ϕ=≡Λϕ . (A.2)
Note that by definition: 0)ππ(∆)j(),(j x
σ
xoxox >=ϕΛϕ
− . Further, from (A.2) and 
the fact that 0π oxox =ϕ∂∆∂=ϕ∂∂ , it follows that: 
0)σj()(j ooo <ϕϕ−=ϕ′  and 0),(σj),(j ox,oxxox <ϕΛϕ−=Λϕ′ . (A.3)




































































σ≡  where xΛ  is defined in (27) 
such that xxx fk=π .  













































where the inequalities follows from (A.3) and (A.4). Recall that, by definition 
ox
x









































































































































The inequalities follows from (A.5) and the fact tha  1D  and 2D  are both greater than 

























































































x  where the last inequality is true by 




























Proof of proposition 11. Part(i): The first statement follows from taking the 














































∂ −−− . 
Since the domestic profit is independent of trade variables, the derivative of average 







































































































>1 and 0x >Λ . □ 
Part (ii): Follows directly from (A.5). □ 


































































































∂ −−−−−−− , 

































































































































































































































                                
 
Note that the sign of n/M T ∂∂ is ambiguous. □ 
Part (iv): Follows directly from (A.5) and the fact that ∆ is unaffected by trade 
liberalization. □ 
Part (v): The equilibrium share of exporting firms is simply σxxζ
−∆= . Hence, since 
0//ζ σxx <τ∆σ−=τ∂∂
− , a decrease in iceberg cost increases the share of exp rting 




productivity threshold above which firms decide to export thereby decreasing the 
average productivity of exporting firms. □ 
Part (vi): From (36), it follows that 0)nτ1/(nτ/s 2ε1εx <+ε−=τ∂∂ −−− . □ 
Part (vii): Since 0/∆)σ(/∆ σεx
σε
x <τε−−=τ∂∂
−− , it follows from (35) that 
0/)O/O( xo
x





B. Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
B.1 Equilibrium 
This appendix provides an overview of the computation required to solve for the 
unique equilibrium of the economy. From (11), domestic profits can be expressed as 
cd fB)( −ϕ=ϕπ
βγ  where γ−−εη−β≡ A)]}1(1[{B 1 , so that by definition of oϕ  it 
follows that co fB =ϕ





































































































1 fB]1)1[()( −ϕ−τ+=ϕ∆ −εβγβγε− ( , so that by definition of the export productivity 
threshold, it follows that xϕ , x
)1
x






















































Further, by definition of ∆, the (overall) profit of an exporting plant can be written as 



























































Using this result and the fact that ox κϕ=ϕ , the average profit can be expressed as 











































































   













































































It is easy to show that 0/V o
E <ϕ∂∂ , ∞=→ϕ
E
0Vlim o  and 0Vlim
E
o
=∞→ϕ . This 
implies that there exist a unique oϕ  such that eo
E f)(V =ϕ . The threshold as a 
function of the parameter can be obtained by solving the integral on the right hand 
side of the equation. The result is given in equation (14) in the text. 
To complete the solution it remains only to obtain the endogenous price index P. 
From (6), (7) and the definition of the thresholdoϕ , it follows that: 
γε−βγϕ−εη−α= /1)1(oc })]1(1[f{A
  , 
Using this result in (7), taking into account the definition of the threshold (oϕ ) given 

























































where κ is defined in (11). Using the solution for the aggregate price index P it is 
possible to solve for every other endogenous variables such as price (p), quantity (q), 
revenue (r), and quality (ω). Note that this solution algorithm does not require the 
knowledge of the mass of incumbent (M) in order to compute P. To obtain M first 
compute the average revenue in the industry (r ) then since the wage rate is equal to 
one it must be the case that r/L)1(M β−=   
 
B.2 Measurement Error 
Suppose that the econometrician wishes to estimate the following regression model: 
 eXY +ξ=      with 0)Xe(E =′ . 
Unfortunately, both the dependent and independent variable are measured with error 
so that the econometrician observes ∗Y  and ∗X  instead. Formally, assume that the 
following holds: 
YeYY +=∗      with 0)Ye(E Y =′ , 0)Xe(E Y =′  and  
XeXX +=∗      with 0)Xe(E X =′ , 0)Ye(E X =′ . 
In addition, while the measurement errors, Ye  and Xe , are uncorrelated with the error 
term e, they are correlated amongst themselves. Formally assume that:  
 0)ee(E Y =′ , 0)ee(E X =′ , and 0)ee(E YXXY ≠Σ=′ . 
 Taking into account these assumptions, the estimated regression model can be 




 e~ξXY += ∗∗  with ξeeee~ XY −+≡ .  





∗∗ ′′+ξ=′′=ξ . 













XX . Therefore the sign and 
magnitude of the bias depends on the unknown variance of measurement error in the 
independent variables, XXΣ , and the correlation between the measurement errors in 
the dependent and independent variables, XYΣ . Since these are unknowable in 
practice very little can be said about the properties of the estimator in the current 
context except that that bias goes to zero as the measurement errors become small. 
 
B.3 Solution Algorithm 
This appendix develops the algorithm used to solve the model computationally. The 
procedure consists of three major steps.  
1. Obtain the productivity threshold above which producers decide to stay in the 
industry. Given a vector of parameters this is easily done using (14). Using 
this threshold it is possible to obtain the ex-post di ribution of producer from 
the ex-ante random vector of entrant generated from the productivity 
distribution. It is also possible to obtain φx, the export productivity threshold 




2. Use the equilibrium productivity threshold to compute the value of A as 
follow – see appendix B.1: 
γε−βγϕ−εη−β= /1)1(oc })]1(1[f{A
 . 
Given A, it is possible to obtain the equilibrium value for the price index and a 
related constant D which is going to be useful in future computations. These 




























3. Obtain equilibrium values for the variables. Once A is known the equilibrium 




−εβϕ=ϕω ,     and     )1(1x A)1()(
−εββε− ϕτ+=ϕω . 
















From the optimal demand function, defined in (2) :  
ε+ηε−−εβεη−εε−−ε ϕρ=ϕϕ=ϕ )1)(1(1d
1





The share of exporting firms is computed by dividing the number of exporters by the 
number of producers. The industry’s share of revenue from exporting is obtained by 





B.4 Weighting Matrix for SMM Estimation 
Given the nature of the moments use in the estimation the variance-covariance matrix 
of the moments cannot be computed from the data. For example, it is not possible to 
compute the variance of the share of exporting firmsince it is only observed once. A 
bootstrapped procedure must therefore be use to obtain an estimate for the weighting 
matrix W. First, using the identity matrix as an estimate for W, it is possible to obtain 
consistent estimates for the vector of structural parameters (θ). These estimates can 
then be used to generate samples of artificial data(100 in this case) from which an 
estimate for the variance-covariance matrix of the simulated moments can be 
computed. The estimated matrix is shown in table XVIII.  
 
Table XVIII: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Moments 
  Stat(p) Stat(r) Stat(q) Top10r Top20r Top50r Exp/Prod 
Stat(p) 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Stat(r) 0.005 0.113 0.084 0.096 0.099 0.070 -0.059 
Stat(q) 0.004 0.084 0.063 0.067 0.069 0.049 -0.041 
Top10r 0.003 0.096 0.067 0.196 0.201 0.141 -0.118 
Top20r 0.003 0.099 0.069 0.201 0.207 0.145 -0.121 
Top50r 0.002 0.070 0.049 0.141 0.145 0.102 -0.085 
Exp/Prod -0.002 -0.059 -0.041 -0.118 -0.121 -0.085 0.071 
Note: This table shows the variance-covariance matrix of the simulated 
moments which is used as an estimate for the optimal weighting matrix W. 
 
Using Ŵ  efficient estimates for the structural parameters can be obtained. Another 
possibility would be to obtain a bootstrapped estima e by creating sample from 
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